I defend metaphysical coherentism, according to which reality is an interdependent network, system, or web, held together by a relation philosophers call \"metaphysical explanation\" or \"grounding\". If coherentism is true, nothing is ungrounded, things ground each other, and understanding what it is to be any given thing – a tree, a house, or a person – is grasping how it fits in: how it grounds and is grounded by its environment.
Coherentism is inconsistent with a widely-accepted, orthodox view of grounding, according to which certain fundamental facts about reality asymmetrically determine everything else. In Chapter 1, I argue that this view is not supported by any compelling argument,but merely assumed.
In Chapter 2, I argue that explanation should be our guide to ground. In other words, I argue that claims about the total distribution of explanations may serve as premises in arguments for conclusions about grounding. I argue, in particular, that instances in which things explain each other are proof of the fact that things ground each other.
In Chapter 3, I argue for coherentism from understanding. To understand, I argue, is to recognize coherence, interconnection, and, generally, how things stand with respect to each other. We understand by grasping the complex weaving-together of relationships. Coherentism, I maintain, best accounts how we may, by discerning what grounds what, come to genuinely understand our world.
In Chapter 4, I pursue an intramural debate among varieties of metaphysical coherentism. I argue that the core features of coherentism are compatible with many different intuitions about the nature of reality, and that the view can take many different forms.
","abstract_html":"<p>I defend metaphysical coherentism, according to which reality is an interdependent network, system, or web, held together by a relation philosophers call "metaphysical explanation" or "grounding". If coherentism is true, nothing is ungrounded, things ground each other, and understanding what it is to be any given thing – a tree, a house, or a person – is grasping how it fits in: how it grounds and is grounded by its environment. </p><p>Coherentism is inconsistent with a widely-accepted, orthodox view of grounding, according to which certain fundamental facts about reality asymmetrically determine everything else. In Chapter 1, I argue that this view is not supported by any compelling argument,but merely assumed.</p><p>In Chapter 2, I argue that explanation should be our guide to ground. In other words, I argue that claims about the total distribution of explanations may serve as premises in arguments for conclusions about grounding. I argue, in particular, that instances in which things explain each other are proof of the fact that things ground each other.</p><p>In Chapter 3, I argue for coherentism from understanding. To understand, I argue, is to recognize coherence, interconnection, and, generally, how things stand with respect to each other. We understand by grasping the complex weaving-together of relationships. Coherentism, I maintain, best accounts how we may, by discerning what grounds what, come to genuinely understand our world.</p><p>In Chapter 4, I pursue an intramural debate among varieties of metaphysical coherentism. I argue that the core features of coherentism are compatible with many different intuitions about the nature of reality, and that the view can take many different forms.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Swiderski, Jan"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Heller, Mark"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2022,"date_issued":"2022-05-15T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2022-05-15T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:56:14Z","subjects":["Coherentism","Explanation","Fundamentality","Grounding","Understanding","Arts and Humanities","Epistemology","Metaphysics","Philosophy"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://surface.syr.edu/etd/1470","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Heller, Mark"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Swiderski, Jan"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Coherentism","Explanation","Fundamentality","Grounding","Understanding","Arts and Humanities","Epistemology","Metaphysics","Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://surface.syr.edu/etd/1470"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["I defend metaphysical coherentism, according to which reality is an interdependent network, system, or web, held together by a relation philosophers call \"metaphysical explanation\" or \"grounding\". If coherentism is true, nothing is ungrounded, things ground each other, and understanding what it is to be any given thing – a tree, a house, or a person – is grasping how it fits in: how it grounds and is grounded by its environment.
Coherentism is inconsistent with a widely-accepted, orthodox view of grounding, according to which certain fundamental facts about reality asymmetrically determine everything else. In Chapter 1, I argue that this view is not supported by any compelling argument,but merely assumed.
In Chapter 2, I argue that explanation should be our guide to ground. In other words, I argue that claims about the total distribution of explanations may serve as premises in arguments for conclusions about grounding. I argue, in particular, that instances in which things explain each other are proof of the fact that things ground each other.
In Chapter 3, I argue for coherentism from understanding. To understand, I argue, is to recognize coherence, interconnection, and, generally, how things stand with respect to each other. We understand by grasping the complex weaving-together of relationships. Coherentism, I maintain, best accounts how we may, by discerning what grounds what, come to genuinely understand our world.
In Chapter 4, I pursue an intramural debate among varieties of metaphysical coherentism. I argue that the core features of coherentism are compatible with many different intuitions about the nature of reality, and that the view can take many different forms.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Metaphysical Coherentism"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Heller, Mark"],"dc:creator":["Swiderski, Jan"],"dc:description.abstract":["I defend metaphysical coherentism, according to which reality is an interdependent network, system, or web, held together by a relation philosophers call \"metaphysical explanation\" or \"grounding\". If coherentism is true, nothing is ungrounded, things ground each other, and understanding what it is to be any given thing – a tree, a house, or a person – is grasping how it fits in: how it grounds and is grounded by its environment.
Coherentism is inconsistent with a widely-accepted, orthodox view of grounding, according to which certain fundamental facts about reality asymmetrically determine everything else. In Chapter 1, I argue that this view is not supported by any compelling argument,but merely assumed.
In Chapter 2, I argue that explanation should be our guide to ground. In other words, I argue that claims about the total distribution of explanations may serve as premises in arguments for conclusions about grounding. I argue, in particular, that instances in which things explain each other are proof of the fact that things ground each other.
In Chapter 3, I argue for coherentism from understanding. To understand, I argue, is to recognize coherence, interconnection, and, generally, how things stand with respect to each other. We understand by grasping the complex weaving-together of relationships. Coherentism, I maintain, best accounts how we may, by discerning what grounds what, come to genuinely understand our world.
In Chapter 4, I pursue an intramural debate among varieties of metaphysical coherentism. I argue that the core features of coherentism are compatible with many different intuitions about the nature of reality, and that the view can take many different forms.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://surface.syr.edu/etd/1470"],"dc:subject":["Coherentism","Explanation","Fundamentality","Grounding","Understanding","Arts and Humanities","Epistemology","Metaphysics","Philosophy"],"dc:title":["Metaphysical Coherentism"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:56:14Z"}