Android’s design philosophy encourages the integration of resources and functionalities from multiple parties, even with different levels of trust. Such program integrations, on one hand, connect every party in the Android ecosystem tightly on one single device. On the other hand, they can also pose severe security problems, if the security design of the underlying integration schemes is not well thought-out. This dissertation systematically evaluates the security design of three integration schemes on Android, including framework module, framework proxy and 3rd-party code embedding. With the security risks identified in each scheme, it concludes that program integrations on Android are unsafe. Furthermore, new frameworks have been designed and implemented to detect and mitigate the threats. The evaluation results on the prototypes have demonstrated their effectiveness.
","abstract_html":"<p>Android’s design philosophy encourages the integration of resources and functionalities from multiple parties, even with different levels of trust. Such program integrations, on one hand, connect every party in the Android ecosystem tightly on one single device. On the other hand, they can also pose severe security problems, if the security design of the underlying integration schemes is not well thought-out. This dissertation systematically evaluates the security design of three integration schemes on Android, including framework module, framework proxy and 3rd-party code embedding. With the security risks identified in each scheme, it concludes that program integrations on Android are unsafe. Furthermore, new frameworks have been designed and implemented to detect and mitigate the threats. The evaluation results on the prototypes have demonstrated their effectiveness.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Zhang, Xiao"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Electrical Engineering and Computer Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["wenliang Du"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-05-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2016-05-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:55:13Z","subjects":["AFrame","Android Clipboard","Android Security","Data Residue Vulnerability","Program Integration","Engineering"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://surface.syr.edu/etd/465","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["wenliang Du"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Zhang, Xiao"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Electrical Engineering and Computer Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["AFrame","Android Clipboard","Android Security","Data Residue Vulnerability","Program Integration","Engineering"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://surface.syr.edu/etd/465"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Android’s design philosophy encourages the integration of resources and functionalities from multiple parties, even with different levels of trust. Such program integrations, on one hand, connect every party in the Android ecosystem tightly on one single device. On the other hand, they can also pose severe security problems, if the security design of the underlying integration schemes is not well thought-out. This dissertation systematically evaluates the security design of three integration schemes on Android, including framework module, framework proxy and 3rd-party code embedding. With the security risks identified in each scheme, it concludes that program integrations on Android are unsafe. Furthermore, new frameworks have been designed and implemented to detect and mitigate the threats. The evaluation results on the prototypes have demonstrated their effectiveness.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["UNCOVERING AND MITIGATING UNSAFE PROGRAM INTEGRATIONS IN ANDROID"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["wenliang Du"],"dc:creator":["Zhang, Xiao"],"dc:description.abstract":["Android’s design philosophy encourages the integration of resources and functionalities from multiple parties, even with different levels of trust. Such program integrations, on one hand, connect every party in the Android ecosystem tightly on one single device. On the other hand, they can also pose severe security problems, if the security design of the underlying integration schemes is not well thought-out. This dissertation systematically evaluates the security design of three integration schemes on Android, including framework module, framework proxy and 3rd-party code embedding. With the security risks identified in each scheme, it concludes that program integrations on Android are unsafe. Furthermore, new frameworks have been designed and implemented to detect and mitigate the threats. The evaluation results on the prototypes have demonstrated their effectiveness.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://surface.syr.edu/etd/465"],"dc:subject":["AFrame","Android Clipboard","Android Security","Data Residue Vulnerability","Program Integration","Engineering"],"dc:title":["UNCOVERING AND MITIGATING UNSAFE PROGRAM INTEGRATIONS IN ANDROID"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Electrical Engineering and Computer Science"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:55:13Z"}