Does Corporate Governance Influence Misstatement Disclosure Timeliness?

<p>The relationship between corporate governance and firm disclosure for firms in crisis, specifically firms in violation of GAAP, may differ from the relationship demonstrated in prior literature between governance and voluntary disclosure. An emerging stream of disclosure literature assumes that the relationship between corporate governance and misstatement disclosure choices mirror that found in prior voluntary disclosure literature though no study has empirically demonstrated that a similar relationship exists. Using a sample of 302 accounting irregularities disclosed between 2000 and 2006, I investigate the role of corporate governance, including both internal and external mechanisms, in influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness. I provide empirical evidence consistent with the value of in-the-money stock options incentivizing management to disclose material misstatements in a less timely manner and a non-linear relationship between management ownership and timeliness where lower levels of ownership improve timeliness and higher levels of ownership inhibit timeliness. The results also suggest that greater board independence, CFO turnover prior to the end of the misstated period, and greater risk of civil litigation improve misstatement disclosure timeliness, while greater board size and board classification have the opposite effect.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Business Administration

Year

2012

Author dc:creator

• Hamilton, Rapheal Joseph

Contributors dc:contributor

• Johann Comprix
• Ravi Dharwadkar

• Corporate Governance
• Disclosure Timeliness
• Financial Misstatements
• Management Incentives
• Restatements
• Accounting
• Business Administration, Management, and Operations

Repository record dc:identifier

https://surface.syr.edu/busad_etd/89

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:surface.syr.edu:busad_etd-1088