Incentive Structures, Labour Performance, and Fruit Quality: Panel Evidence from a South African Deciduous Fruit Operation (2017–2019)

This study investigates whether including B1–C2 employees in a performance-based incentive scheme improves fruit quality in a South African deciduous fruit operation. Using a three-year panel (2017–2019) from five commercial farms managed by Crookes Brothers (Pty) Limited, the analysis isolates the association between incentive type and fruit quality using farm-fixed effects regression with cluster-robust and wild-bootstrap inference. Results indicate that seasonal group-based incentives are consistently associated with lower (better-quality) fruit-damage scores than daily individual incentives, even after controlling for climatic and operational variation. These effects translate into economically meaningful reductions in fruit downgraded at the packhouse level. The findings suggest that an incentive structure which emphasises collective responsibility may reduce free-riding, improve care during harvesting, and strengthen alignment of worker behaviour around quality. Policy implications include the need for structured piloting of group schemes, integration of incentive design with monitoring systems, and revisiting equity frameworks in labour-intensive agriculture. The study contributes novel panel-based evidence to the limited literature on incentive pay in agricultural labour markets and highlights the role of institutional design and motivation theory in shaping fruit quality outcomes.

Grantor dc:publisher

Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University

Year dc:date.issued

2026

Author dc:creator

• Segole, Kagiso

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Traub, Lulama

Language dc:language.iso

en

Repository record dc:identifier.uri

https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/135873

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/135873