{"id":{"repo_id":"st-andrews","oai_identifier":"oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/14814"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/st-andrews/oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/14814","repository":{"repo_id":"st-andrews","name":"U. of St. Andrews","base_url":"https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/dspace-oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The theory of rational decision and the foundations of ethics","abstract":"The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice.","abstract_html":"The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Sowden, Lanning Patrick"],"institution":"University of St Andrews","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Mayo, Bernard"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":1983,"date_issued":"1983-07","date_published":"1983-07","updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:10:04Z","subjects":[],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14814","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Mayo, Bernard"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Sowden, Lanning Patrick"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2018-07-02T14:53:52Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2018-07-02T14:53:52Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["1983-07"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["University of St Andrews"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["The University of St Andrews"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["PhD Doctor of Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14814"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The theory of rational decision and the foundations of ethics"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Mayo, Bernard"],"dc:creator":["Sowden, Lanning Patrick"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2018-07-02T14:53:52Z"],"dc:date.available":["2018-07-02T14:53:52Z"],"dc:date.issued":["1983-07"],"dc:description.abstract":["The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice."],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14814"],"dc:language.iso":["en"],"dc:publisher":["University of St Andrews"],"dc:publisher.institution":["The University of St Andrews"],"dc:title":["The theory of rational decision and the foundations of ethics"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"dc:type.qualificationlevel":["Doctoral"],"dc:type.qualificationname":["PhD Doctor of Philosophy"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:10:04Z"}