This study reports the results of a series of experiments designed to provide empirical evidence related to fair value opinion shopping. Experiment 1 provides initial evidence that managers fair value opinion shop for external valuation professionals in the current regulatory environment. Further, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that informing managers that they are required to disclose to the board and/or auditor the fact that they obtained multiple opinions generally deters managers from fair value opinion shopping for personal benefits, but not for shareholder benefits. Results of Experiment 2 show that a regulatory change requiring boards to approve or reject a manager's request to seek a second fair value opinion will serve as an effective control against fair value opinion shopping. However, paradoxically, results of Experiment 2 show that boards are more likely to approve a manager's request to fair value opinion shop when it is transparently disclosed. Experiment 3 shows that a regulatory change requiring firms to inform their auditor when they obtain multiple fair value opinions results in increased audit procedures and a reduction in auditors beliefs about the reliability of the second external valuation professional's fair value opinion.
","abstract_html":"<p>This study reports the results of a series of experiments designed to provide empirical evidence related to fair value opinion shopping. Experiment 1 provides initial evidence that managers fair value opinion shop for external valuation professionals in the current regulatory environment. Further, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that informing managers that they are required to disclose to the board and/or auditor the fact that they obtained multiple opinions generally deters managers from fair value opinion shopping for personal benefits, but not for shareholder benefits. Results of Experiment 2 show that a regulatory change requiring boards to approve or reject a manager's request to seek a second fair value opinion will serve as an effective control against fair value opinion shopping. However, paradoxically, results of Experiment 2 show that boards are more likely to approve a manager's request to fair value opinion shop when it is transparently disclosed. Experiment 3 shows that a regulatory change requiring firms to inform their auditor when they obtain multiple fair value opinions results in increased audit procedures and a reduction in auditors beliefs about the reliability of the second external valuation professional's fair value opinion.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Salzsieder, Leigh"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Campus Access Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Moore School of Business","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Scott Jackson"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2010,"date_issued":"2010-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2010-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:37:21Z","subjects":["Business","Business Administration, Management, and Operations","Deterrence","Fair Value Measurement","Governance","Opinion Shopping"],"languages":[],"rights":["© 2010, Leigh Salzsieder"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/255","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Scott Jackson"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Salzsieder, Leigh"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Moore School of Business"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Campus Access Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Business","Business Administration, Management, and Operations","Deterrence","Fair Value Measurement","Governance","Opinion Shopping"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["© 2010, Leigh Salzsieder"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/255"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This study reports the results of a series of experiments designed to provide empirical evidence related to fair value opinion shopping. Experiment 1 provides initial evidence that managers fair value opinion shop for external valuation professionals in the current regulatory environment. Further, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that informing managers that they are required to disclose to the board and/or auditor the fact that they obtained multiple opinions generally deters managers from fair value opinion shopping for personal benefits, but not for shareholder benefits. Results of Experiment 2 show that a regulatory change requiring boards to approve or reject a manager's request to seek a second fair value opinion will serve as an effective control against fair value opinion shopping. However, paradoxically, results of Experiment 2 show that boards are more likely to approve a manager's request to fair value opinion shop when it is transparently disclosed. Experiment 3 shows that a regulatory change requiring firms to inform their auditor when they obtain multiple fair value opinions results in increased audit procedures and a reduction in auditors beliefs about the reliability of the second external valuation professional's fair value opinion.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Fair Value Opinion Shopping"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Scott Jackson"],"dc:creator":["Salzsieder, Leigh"],"dc:description.abstract":["This study reports the results of a series of experiments designed to provide empirical evidence related to fair value opinion shopping. Experiment 1 provides initial evidence that managers fair value opinion shop for external valuation professionals in the current regulatory environment. Further, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that informing managers that they are required to disclose to the board and/or auditor the fact that they obtained multiple opinions generally deters managers from fair value opinion shopping for personal benefits, but not for shareholder benefits. Results of Experiment 2 show that a regulatory change requiring boards to approve or reject a manager's request to seek a second fair value opinion will serve as an effective control against fair value opinion shopping. However, paradoxically, results of Experiment 2 show that boards are more likely to approve a manager's request to fair value opinion shop when it is transparently disclosed. Experiment 3 shows that a regulatory change requiring firms to inform their auditor when they obtain multiple fair value opinions results in increased audit procedures and a reduction in auditors beliefs about the reliability of the second external valuation professional's fair value opinion.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/255"],"dc:rights":["© 2010, Leigh Salzsieder"],"dc:subject":["Business","Business Administration, Management, and Operations","Deterrence","Fair Value Measurement","Governance","Opinion Shopping"],"dc:title":["Fair Value Opinion Shopping"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Moore School of Business"],"thesis:degree_level":["Campus Access Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:37:21Z"}