Preferred modes of thinking, otherwise known as biases, have been well documented in adult reasoning and decision-making (Evans, 2003; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Researchers have explained these biases by proposing that the basis for them is a system of thought that relies mostly on intuition and “gut feelings” rather than logical analysis of the situation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). According to standard dual-process theories, intuition is described as a thought process so quick, it is automatic and, at times unconscious; conversely, analytical thinking is slow and steady, involving analysis and conscious deliberation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Though several dual-process models for cognition have been proposed, including system 1/system 2, prototype/willingness, and the hot/cold empathy gap, only fuzzy-trace theory offers concrete predictions concerning development that are consistent with known data (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Reyna & Casillas, 2009). For example, research has shown that adults display greater reasoning biases than children, in that adults are more likely than children to process and use extraneous information, such as inconsequential differences in wording, in their decisions (Jacobs & Potenza, 1991; Reyna & Ellis, 1994). Of interest for the current study, fuzzy-trace theory posits that different ways of processing lead to different outcomes in risk-taking behavior. Further, fuzzy-trace theory proposes a framework that explains how risk perception changes across the lifespan and how these changes often lead to less risk-taking from childhood and adolescence into adulthood (Reyna, 2012; Reyna et al., 2018; Reyna & Adam, 2003; Reyna & Farley, 2006).
","abstract_html":"<p>Preferred modes of thinking, otherwise known as biases, have been well documented in adult reasoning and decision-making (Evans, 2003; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Researchers have explained these biases by proposing that the basis for them is a system of thought that relies mostly on intuition and “gut feelings” rather than logical analysis of the situation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). According to standard dual-process theories, intuition is described as a thought process so quick, it is automatic and, at times unconscious; conversely, analytical thinking is slow and steady, involving analysis and conscious deliberation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Though several dual-process models for cognition have been proposed, including system 1/system 2, prototype/willingness, and the hot/cold empathy gap, only fuzzy-trace theory offers concrete predictions concerning development that are consistent with known data (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Reyna & Casillas, 2009). For example, research has shown that adults display greater reasoning biases than children, in that adults are more likely than children to process and use extraneous information, such as inconsequential differences in wording, in their decisions (Jacobs & Potenza, 1991; Reyna & Ellis, 1994). Of interest for the current study, fuzzy-trace theory posits that different ways of processing lead to different outcomes in risk-taking behavior. Further, fuzzy-trace theory proposes a framework that explains how risk perception changes across the lifespan and how these changes often lead to less risk-taking from childhood and adolescence into adulthood (Reyna, 2012; Reyna et al., 2018; Reyna & Adam, 2003; Reyna & Farley, 2006).</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Machann, Adrienne"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Master of Arts - Psychology","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Psychology","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Dr. Steven Estrada","Dr. Scott Drury","Dr. Sylvia Middlebrook"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-05-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2019-05-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:30:22Z","subjects":["risk-taking","fuzzy-trace theory","criminality","decision-making","framing","Cognition and Perception","Criminology and Criminal Justice","Developmental Psychology","Health Psychology","Psychology"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/etds/272","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Dr. Steven Estrada","Dr. Scott Drury","Dr. Sylvia Middlebrook"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Machann, Adrienne"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2019-05-20T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Psychology"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts - Psychology"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["risk-taking","fuzzy-trace theory","criminality","decision-making","framing","Cognition and Perception","Criminology and Criminal Justice","Developmental Psychology","Health Psychology","Psychology"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/etds/272"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Preferred modes of thinking, otherwise known as biases, have been well documented in adult reasoning and decision-making (Evans, 2003; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Researchers have explained these biases by proposing that the basis for them is a system of thought that relies mostly on intuition and “gut feelings” rather than logical analysis of the situation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). According to standard dual-process theories, intuition is described as a thought process so quick, it is automatic and, at times unconscious; conversely, analytical thinking is slow and steady, involving analysis and conscious deliberation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Though several dual-process models for cognition have been proposed, including system 1/system 2, prototype/willingness, and the hot/cold empathy gap, only fuzzy-trace theory offers concrete predictions concerning development that are consistent with known data (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Reyna & Casillas, 2009). For example, research has shown that adults display greater reasoning biases than children, in that adults are more likely than children to process and use extraneous information, such as inconsequential differences in wording, in their decisions (Jacobs & Potenza, 1991; Reyna & Ellis, 1994). Of interest for the current study, fuzzy-trace theory posits that different ways of processing lead to different outcomes in risk-taking behavior. Further, fuzzy-trace theory proposes a framework that explains how risk perception changes across the lifespan and how these changes often lead to less risk-taking from childhood and adolescence into adulthood (Reyna, 2012; Reyna et al., 2018; Reyna & Adam, 2003; Reyna & Farley, 2006).
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Risk-taking, thinking styles, and criminality: A fuzzy-trace theory perspective"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Dr. Steven Estrada","Dr. Scott Drury","Dr. Sylvia Middlebrook"],"dc:creator":["Machann, Adrienne"],"dc:date.available":["2019-05-20T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["Preferred modes of thinking, otherwise known as biases, have been well documented in adult reasoning and decision-making (Evans, 2003; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Researchers have explained these biases by proposing that the basis for them is a system of thought that relies mostly on intuition and “gut feelings” rather than logical analysis of the situation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). According to standard dual-process theories, intuition is described as a thought process so quick, it is automatic and, at times unconscious; conversely, analytical thinking is slow and steady, involving analysis and conscious deliberation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Though several dual-process models for cognition have been proposed, including system 1/system 2, prototype/willingness, and the hot/cold empathy gap, only fuzzy-trace theory offers concrete predictions concerning development that are consistent with known data (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Reyna & Casillas, 2009). For example, research has shown that adults display greater reasoning biases than children, in that adults are more likely than children to process and use extraneous information, such as inconsequential differences in wording, in their decisions (Jacobs & Potenza, 1991; Reyna & Ellis, 1994). Of interest for the current study, fuzzy-trace theory posits that different ways of processing lead to different outcomes in risk-taking behavior. Further, fuzzy-trace theory proposes a framework that explains how risk perception changes across the lifespan and how these changes often lead to less risk-taking from childhood and adolescence into adulthood (Reyna, 2012; Reyna et al., 2018; Reyna & Adam, 2003; Reyna & Farley, 2006).
"],"dc:identifier":["https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/etds/272"],"dc:subject":["risk-taking","fuzzy-trace theory","criminality","decision-making","framing","Cognition and Perception","Criminology and Criminal Justice","Developmental Psychology","Health Psychology","Psychology"],"dc:title":["Risk-taking, thinking styles, and criminality: A fuzzy-trace theory perspective"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Psychology"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts - Psychology"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:30:22Z"}