Modified Libertarianism: An Analysis of Eleonore Stump's Interpretation of Augustinian Freedom
type: CreativeWork
description: This dissertation provides an analysis of Eleonore Stump’s interpretation of Augustinian freedom, which she characterizes as a modified form of libertarianism. Stump’s desire is to identify modified libertarianism as an original contribution to the free will debate which she claims is evident in Augustine’s writings throughout his career. After a thorough evaluation of the influences upon Augustine’s theory of the will and its development throughout his body of works, this dissertation agrees with Stump that approaching Augustine as essentially united in his beliefs on free will and grace does offer an entirely unique perspective. Not only do these insights bring us closer to understanding how free will and the sovereignty of God work together, but they offer conceptual resources for understanding the metaphysic of free will in general. While Stump is successful in bringing to light these unique features of Augustine’s position, modified libertarianism is distinctly her own position. Having been significantly influenced by Harry G. Frankfurt’s rejection of the principle of alternative possibilities and her own interpretation of Aquinas’ position on the will’s ability to stop resisting God’s gift of faith—which she refers to as quiescence—her position goes too far in its desire to remain libertarian and is fundamentally semi-Pelagian. The conclusion of this work is that had Stump paid closer attention of both Frankfurt and Augustine, her position would be better articulated as a modified version of compatibilism rather than libertarianism.
abstract: This dissertation provides an analysis of Eleonore Stump’s interpretation of Augustinian freedom, which she characterizes as a modified form of libertarianism. Stump’s desire is to identify modified libertarianism as an original contribution to the free will debate which she claims is evident in Augustine’s writings throughout his career. After a thorough evaluation of the influences upon Augustine’s theory of the will and its development throughout his body of works, this dissertation agrees with Stump that approaching Augustine as essentially united in his beliefs on free will and grace does offer an entirely unique perspective. Not only do these insights bring us closer to understanding how free will and the sovereignty of God work together, but they offer conceptual resources for understanding the metaphysic of free will in general. While Stump is successful in bringing to light these unique features of Augustine’s position, modified libertarianism is distinctly her own position. Having been significantly influenced by Harry G. Frankfurt’s rejection of the principle of alternative possibilities and her own interpretation of Aquinas’ position on the will’s ability to stop resisting God’s gift of faith—which she refers to as quiescence—her position goes too far in its desire to remain libertarian and is fundamentally semi-Pelagian. The conclusion of this work is that had Stump paid closer attention of both Frankfurt and Augustine, her position would be better articulated as a modified version of compatibilism rather than libertarianism.
author: Dewey, Michael Willard
language: en_US
date published: 2026-05
date modified: 2026-07-27T21:06:08Z
provider: Southern Baptist Theological Seminary
publisher: Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
type: WebPage
source organization: The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary

PropertyValue
property ID: Handle
value: https://hdl.handle.net/10392/7639