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University of Saskatchewan

Why Do Banks Participate in a FDIC Failed Bank Auction? A study on both winning and non-winning bidders’ performance

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The recent Global Financial Crisis provides a great opportunity to study banking mergers, especially ones with failed targets and government assistance. In our study, we adopt multiple approaches to study two main questions. First, we are interested to learn if mergers lead to real economic synergies for combined entities using operating measures. We adopt Propensity Score Matching to compare failed bank acquirers to their close peers. Results show that acquirers in regulatory mergers experience significant improvements in both profitability and cost efficiency immediately after the merger transaction. In addition, we are interested in learning whether participation in a failed bank auction benefits a participant even when this participant is not eventually chosen as the acquirer. Our theory is that participation in the auction reduces information asymmetry and improves the credibility of the participant, a phenomena we call the “Certification Effect”. Traditional event study methodology is applied and results show that acquirers in regulatory mergers tend to experience significantly positive market reaction, which is rationalized by their outperformance in operation. More interesting, we find that the market reaction to first time participation in failed bank auctions is significantly higher than the market reaction to the announcement of participation by an experienced participant. This result holds for both the successful or unsuccessful bidder groups.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Science (M.Sc.)
Level thesis:degree_level
Masters
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Finance
Grantor
University of Saskatchewan
Year dc:date.issued
2015

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Zhang, Sicong 1989-
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Mamun, Abdullah
  • Tannous, George
  • Yu, Miaomiao
  • Roberts, Gordon S

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/10388/12652
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:harvest.usask.ca:10388/12652

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Saskatchewan
Base URL
harvest.usask.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-24
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Zhang, Sicong 1989-. Why Do Banks Participate in a FDIC Failed Bank Auction? A study on both winning and non-winning bidders’ performance. Masters thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2015. https://hdl.handle.net/10388/12652