Gas network optimisation using Nash equilibria derived from dynamic non-cooperative non-zero sum game theory

Efficient management of the national gas grid in Great Britain involves a complexoptimisation task to resolve the sometimes conflicting requirements of security ofsupplies to customers, contractual obligation to suppliers and the cost of transmission,whilst at all times ensuring the integrity of the system. Existing computersoftware aids for this task in routine use within British Gas divide the optimisationinto several parts which are treated separately before the results are broughttogether for expert assessment and decision. A single, integrated suite of programsto address all aspects of the optimisation would have obvious attractions. In thiswork we describe a possible framework for such a development, based on a dynamicnon-cooperative game theoretic approach, in which the national transmission system(NTS) is viewed as a closed trading market for the trade of gas related commodities.The bulk of the thesis describes how the NTS is decentralized to be conceptuallyviewed as a macro economy for the trade of pressure, linepack, transmissioncapacity, mass flow rates of gas, and the like. A producer source terminaloligopoly, trading with a second transmission compressor station oligopoly isoutlined to address the interaction between sourcing and transmission operations.The consumers network/demand off-takes are shown to be the key elementsof the framework which maintain both the physical and economic integrity of theNTS.A conceptual framework is developed to implement the design to form HERO— an experimental economic decision tool. The conceptual elegance of our gametheoretic approach is reflected in the computational simplicity, and hence efficiency,associated with the natural computational parallelism and integral discrete and continuousplayer decision making behaviour. In addition to implementation details,results from test applications to small sections of the UK NTS are presented as evidenceof its potential value in allowing grid controllers to directly address networkoperations from a strategic and tactical managerial view point.

Level dc:type.qualificationlevel

Doctoral (Level 8)

Year dc:date.issued

1992

Author dc:creator

• Ramchandani, N-L

Language dc:language

en

Identifier

oai:salford-repository.worktribe.com:1338501

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:salford-repository.worktribe.com:1338501