{"id":{"repo_id":"rosario","oai_identifier":"oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/38189"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/rosario/oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/38189","repository":{"repo_id":"rosario","name":"Universidad del Rosario","base_url":"https://repository.urosario.edu.co/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The impact of discretionary hiring on bureaucrats' corruption perceptions, satisfaction, and the mishandling of public resources","abstract":"Este artículo examina el impacto en un país en desarrollo de adoptar un sistema de selección de servidores públicos a través de contratos discrecionales y temporales en tres aspectos del sector público: las percepciones de corrupción de los burócratas, la satisfacción con el empleo, y el mal manejo de los recursos públicos. Estudio el impacto de una reforma legislativa que incentivó a ciertas entidades públicas en Colombia a seleccionar personal usando el régimen de contratación directa. Utilizando un diseño de diferencias en diferencias, encuentro un incremento relativo en la percepción de nepotismo, la influencia de las redes políticas, y del intercambio de dinero y favores en los procesos de contratación de las entidades del orden territorial, donde la reforma tuvo mayor incidencia. Los servidores públicos de estas entidades también experimentaron una reducción diferencial en su satisfacción laboral, y las entidades aumentaron su probabilidad de aparecer en boletines de sanciones por mal uso de recursos. Datos de hogares sugieren que deterioro efectivo en la meritocracia, y los análisis de triple diferencia proponen que un aumento en la percepción de injusticia en las prácticas de selección puede estar detrás de los efectos en las percepciones y la satisfacción.","abstract_html":"Este artículo examina el impacto en un país en desarrollo de adoptar un sistema de selección de servidores públicos a través de contratos discrecionales y temporales en tres aspectos del sector público: las percepciones de corrupción de los burócratas, la satisfacción con el empleo, y el mal manejo de los recursos públicos. Estudio el impacto de una reforma legislativa que incentivó a ciertas entidades públicas en Colombia a seleccionar personal usando el régimen de contratación directa. Utilizando un diseño de diferencias en diferencias, encuentro un incremento relativo en la percepción de nepotismo, la influencia de las redes políticas, y del intercambio de dinero y favores en los procesos de contratación de las entidades del orden territorial, donde la reforma tuvo mayor incidencia. Los servidores públicos de estas entidades también experimentaron una reducción diferencial en su satisfacción laboral, y las entidades aumentaron su probabilidad de aparecer en boletines de sanciones por mal uso de recursos. Datos de hogares sugieren que deterioro efectivo en la meritocracia, y los análisis de triple diferencia proponen que un aumento en la percepción de injusticia en las prácticas de selección puede estar detrás de los efectos en las percepciones y la satisfacción.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Calderón Amaya, Andrés Yesid"],"institution":"Universidad del Rosario","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2023,"date_issued":"2023-02-10","date_published":"2023-02-10","updated_at":"2026-07-27T20:47:08Z","subjects":["Contratos discrecionales","Percepciones de corrupción","Satisfacción laboral","Mal manejo de recursos públicos","Discretionary contracts","Corruption perceptions","Job satisfaction","Mishandling of public resources"],"languages":["spa"],"rights":["info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess"],"rights_urls":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/38189"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/38189","href":"https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/38189","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_38189","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Calderón Amaya, Andrés Yesid"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2023-02-10","2023-03-06T17:59:04Z"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Universidad del Rosario","Facultad de Economía","Maestría en Economía"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis","info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Contratos discrecionales","Percepciones de corrupción","Satisfacción laboral","Mal manejo de recursos públicos","Discretionary contracts","Corruption perceptions","Job satisfaction","Mishandling of public resources"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["spa"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess","http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_38189","https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/38189"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Este artículo examina el impacto en un país en desarrollo de adoptar un sistema de selección de servidores públicos a través de contratos discrecionales y temporales en tres aspectos del sector público: las percepciones de corrupción de los burócratas, la satisfacción con el empleo, y el mal manejo de los recursos públicos. Estudio el impacto de una reforma legislativa que incentivó a ciertas entidades públicas en Colombia a seleccionar personal usando el régimen de contratación directa. Utilizando un diseño de diferencias en diferencias, encuentro un incremento relativo en la percepción de nepotismo, la influencia de las redes políticas, y del intercambio de dinero y favores en los procesos de contratación de las entidades del orden territorial, donde la reforma tuvo mayor incidencia. Los servidores públicos de estas entidades también experimentaron una reducción diferencial en su satisfacción laboral, y las entidades aumentaron su probabilidad de aparecer en boletines de sanciones por mal uso de recursos. Datos de hogares sugieren que deterioro efectivo en la meritocracia, y los análisis de triple diferencia proponen que un aumento en la percepción de injusticia en las prácticas de selección puede estar detrás de los efectos en las percepciones y la satisfacción.","This paper examines the impact in a developing country of adopting a system of selection of civil servants through discretionary and temporary contracts on three aspects of the public sector: corruption perceptions of bureaucrats, job satisfaction, and the mishandling of public resources. I study the impact of a legislative reform that incentivized certain Colombian public agencies to hire personnel using the direct-procurement regime. Relying on a difference-in-differences design, I find a relative increase in the awareness of nepotism, the influence of political networks, and of money and favors in the selection processes of territorial-order entities, which were the most affected by the reform. Civil servants in these agencies also experienced a differential decrease in job satisfaction, and the institutions were more likely to appear in bulletins of sanctions for mishandling of resources. Household data suggests an actual deterioration of meritocracy, and triple difference analyses suggest that perceptions of unfairness in hiring practices might drive the effects on perceptions and satisfaction."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["58 pp","application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:source","label":"Dc Source","values":["Alesina, Alberto, Alberto Carrasquilla, and Juan Jose Echavarria. 2005. Decentral- ization in Colombia. MIT Press.","Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, and B. Kelsey Jack. 2014. “No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery.” Journal of Public Economics 120 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.014.","Bernal, Raquel, Jorge Iván Gónzalez, Juan Carlos Henao et al. 2017. “Comisión del gasto y la inversión pública. Informe final.”Technical report, Bogotá, D.C. https: //www.repository.fedesarrollo.org.co/handle/11445/3516.","Besley, Timothy J, Robin Burgess, Adnan Khan, and Guo Xu. 2021. “Bureaucracy and Development.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 29163. 10.3386/w29163.","Carreri, Maria, and Luis R Martinez. 2022. “Economic and Political Effects of Fiscal Rules: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Colombia.” 10.2139/ssrn.3929550.","de Chaisemartin, C, and X D’HaultfŒuille. 2017. “Fuzzy Differences-in-Differences.” The Review of Economic Studies 85 (2): 999–1028. 10.1093/restud/rdx049.","Dahis, Ricardo, Laura Schiavon, and Thiago Scot. 2022. “Selecting Top Bureaucrats: Admission Exams and Performance in Brazil.”","Dahlström, Carl, Victor Lapuente, and Jan Teorell. 2012. “The Merit of Meritocrati- zation: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption.” Political Research Quarterly 65 (3): 656–668. 10.1177/1065912911408109.","Dixit, Avinash. 2002. “Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review.” The Journal of Human Resources 37 696–727. 10.2307/3069614.","Evans, Peter, and James E Rauch. 1999. “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of \"Weberian\" State Structures on Economic Growth.” Amer- ican Sociological Review 64 748–765. 10.2307/2657374.","Finan, F., B.A. Olken, and R. Pande. 2017. “Chapter 6 - The Personnel Economics of the Developing State.” In Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, edited by Banerjee, Abhijit Vinayak, and Esther Duflo Volume 2. of Handbook of Economic Field Experiments 467–514, North-Holland, . https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hefe.2016.08. 001.","Finan, Frederico, Benjamin A Olken, and Rohini Pande. 2015. “The Personnel Economics of the State.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 21825. 10.3386/w21825.","Keefer, Philip, and Razvan Vlaicu. 2022. “Employee Trust and Performance Constraints in Public Sector Organizations.” IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP- 1376. 10.18235/0004456.","Lazear, Edward P., and Kathryn L. Shaw. 2007. “Personnel Economics: The Economist’s View of Human Resources.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (4): 91–114. 10.1257/jep.21.4.91.","Lewis, David E. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton University Press.","Moreira, Diana, and Santiago Pérez. 2022. “Civil Service Reform and Organizational Practices: Evidence from the Pendleton Act.”","Muñoz, Pablo, and Mounu Prem. 2022. “Managers’ Productivity and Recruitment in the Public Sector: The Case of School Principals.” https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/ 7zn2b.","OECD. 2013. “Colombia: Implementing Good Governance.”Technical report. 10. 1787/9789264202177-en.","Ornaghi, Arianna. 2019. “Civil Service Reforms: Evidence from U.S. Police Departments.”","Riaño, Juan Felipe. 2022. “Bureaucratic Nepotism.”","Sanabria Pulido, Pablo, María Alejandra González, and Óscar Becerra. 2019. “¿Cómo mejorar y racionalizar la contratación por prestación de servicios en el sector público en Colombia? Una mirada desde la calidad del empleo.” Notas de Política No. 34, http://hdl.handle.net/1992/40795.","Voth, Joachim, and Guo Xu. 2022. “Discretion and Destruction: Promotions, Performance, and Patronage in the Royal Navy.”","World Bank. 2022. “Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators version 3.0.”","Xu, Guo. 2018. “The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire.” American Economic Review 108 (11): 3170–3198. 10.1257/aer.20171339.","Xu, Guo. 2019. “The colonial origins of fiscal capacity: Evidence from patronage governors.” Journal of Comparative Economics 47 (2): 263–276. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.jce.2019.01.001.","Zuleta, María Margarita, and Carlos Andrés Caro. 2020. “Mirada a las alertas de riesgo de corrupción del sistema de compra pública colombiano identificadas en el cálculo del índice con la metodología del IMCO.”Technical report, Fedesarollo, Bogotá, D.C. http://hdl.handle.net/11445/3930.","instname:Universidad del Rosario","reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The impact of discretionary hiring on bureaucrats' corruption perceptions, satisfaction, and the mishandling of public resources","El impacto de la contratación discrecional en las percepciones de corrupción de los burócratas, su satisfacción, y el mal uso de los recursos públicos"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Calderón Amaya, Andrés Yesid"],"dc:date":["2023-02-10","2023-03-06T17:59:04Z"],"dc:description":["Este artículo examina el impacto en un país en desarrollo de adoptar un sistema de selección de servidores públicos a través de contratos discrecionales y temporales en tres aspectos del sector público: las percepciones de corrupción de los burócratas, la satisfacción con el empleo, y el mal manejo de los recursos públicos. Estudio el impacto de una reforma legislativa que incentivó a ciertas entidades públicas en Colombia a seleccionar personal usando el régimen de contratación directa. Utilizando un diseño de diferencias en diferencias, encuentro un incremento relativo en la percepción de nepotismo, la influencia de las redes políticas, y del intercambio de dinero y favores en los procesos de contratación de las entidades del orden territorial, donde la reforma tuvo mayor incidencia. Los servidores públicos de estas entidades también experimentaron una reducción diferencial en su satisfacción laboral, y las entidades aumentaron su probabilidad de aparecer en boletines de sanciones por mal uso de recursos. Datos de hogares sugieren que deterioro efectivo en la meritocracia, y los análisis de triple diferencia proponen que un aumento en la percepción de injusticia en las prácticas de selección puede estar detrás de los efectos en las percepciones y la satisfacción.","This paper examines the impact in a developing country of adopting a system of selection of civil servants through discretionary and temporary contracts on three aspects of the public sector: corruption perceptions of bureaucrats, job satisfaction, and the mishandling of public resources. I study the impact of a legislative reform that incentivized certain Colombian public agencies to hire personnel using the direct-procurement regime. Relying on a difference-in-differences design, I find a relative increase in the awareness of nepotism, the influence of political networks, and of money and favors in the selection processes of territorial-order entities, which were the most affected by the reform. Civil servants in these agencies also experienced a differential decrease in job satisfaction, and the institutions were more likely to appear in bulletins of sanctions for mishandling of resources. Household data suggests an actual deterioration of meritocracy, and triple difference analyses suggest that perceptions of unfairness in hiring practices might drive the effects on perceptions and satisfaction."],"dc:format":["58 pp","application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_38189","https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/38189"],"dc:language":["spa"],"dc:publisher":["Universidad del Rosario","Facultad de Economía","Maestría en Economía"],"dc:rights":["info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess","http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"],"dc:source":["Alesina, Alberto, Alberto Carrasquilla, and Juan Jose Echavarria. 2005. Decentral- ization in Colombia. MIT Press.","Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, and B. Kelsey Jack. 2014. “No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery.” Journal of Public Economics 120 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.014.","Bernal, Raquel, Jorge Iván Gónzalez, Juan Carlos Henao et al. 2017. “Comisión del gasto y la inversión pública. Informe final.”Technical report, Bogotá, D.C. https: //www.repository.fedesarrollo.org.co/handle/11445/3516.","Besley, Timothy J, Robin Burgess, Adnan Khan, and Guo Xu. 2021. “Bureaucracy and Development.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 29163. 10.3386/w29163.","Carreri, Maria, and Luis R Martinez. 2022. “Economic and Political Effects of Fiscal Rules: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Colombia.” 10.2139/ssrn.3929550.","de Chaisemartin, C, and X D’HaultfŒuille. 2017. “Fuzzy Differences-in-Differences.” The Review of Economic Studies 85 (2): 999–1028. 10.1093/restud/rdx049.","Dahis, Ricardo, Laura Schiavon, and Thiago Scot. 2022. “Selecting Top Bureaucrats: Admission Exams and Performance in Brazil.”","Dahlström, Carl, Victor Lapuente, and Jan Teorell. 2012. “The Merit of Meritocrati- zation: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption.” Political Research Quarterly 65 (3): 656–668. 10.1177/1065912911408109.","Dixit, Avinash. 2002. “Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review.” The Journal of Human Resources 37 696–727. 10.2307/3069614.","Evans, Peter, and James E Rauch. 1999. “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of \"Weberian\" State Structures on Economic Growth.” Amer- ican Sociological Review 64 748–765. 10.2307/2657374.","Finan, F., B.A. Olken, and R. Pande. 2017. “Chapter 6 - The Personnel Economics of the Developing State.” In Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, edited by Banerjee, Abhijit Vinayak, and Esther Duflo Volume 2. of Handbook of Economic Field Experiments 467–514, North-Holland, . https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hefe.2016.08. 001.","Finan, Frederico, Benjamin A Olken, and Rohini Pande. 2015. “The Personnel Economics of the State.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 21825. 10.3386/w21825.","Keefer, Philip, and Razvan Vlaicu. 2022. “Employee Trust and Performance Constraints in Public Sector Organizations.” IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP- 1376. 10.18235/0004456.","Lazear, Edward P., and Kathryn L. Shaw. 2007. “Personnel Economics: The Economist’s View of Human Resources.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (4): 91–114. 10.1257/jep.21.4.91.","Lewis, David E. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton University Press.","Moreira, Diana, and Santiago Pérez. 2022. “Civil Service Reform and Organizational Practices: Evidence from the Pendleton Act.”","Muñoz, Pablo, and Mounu Prem. 2022. “Managers’ Productivity and Recruitment in the Public Sector: The Case of School Principals.” https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/ 7zn2b.","OECD. 2013. “Colombia: Implementing Good Governance.”Technical report. 10. 1787/9789264202177-en.","Ornaghi, Arianna. 2019. “Civil Service Reforms: Evidence from U.S. Police Departments.”","Riaño, Juan Felipe. 2022. “Bureaucratic Nepotism.”","Sanabria Pulido, Pablo, María Alejandra González, and Óscar Becerra. 2019. “¿Cómo mejorar y racionalizar la contratación por prestación de servicios en el sector público en Colombia? Una mirada desde la calidad del empleo.” Notas de Política No. 34, http://hdl.handle.net/1992/40795.","Voth, Joachim, and Guo Xu. 2022. “Discretion and Destruction: Promotions, Performance, and Patronage in the Royal Navy.”","World Bank. 2022. “Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators version 3.0.”","Xu, Guo. 2018. “The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire.” American Economic Review 108 (11): 3170–3198. 10.1257/aer.20171339.","Xu, Guo. 2019. “The colonial origins of fiscal capacity: Evidence from patronage governors.” Journal of Comparative Economics 47 (2): 263–276. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.jce.2019.01.001.","Zuleta, María Margarita, and Carlos Andrés Caro. 2020. “Mirada a las alertas de riesgo de corrupción del sistema de compra pública colombiano identificadas en el cálculo del índice con la metodología del IMCO.”Technical report, Fedesarollo, Bogotá, D.C. http://hdl.handle.net/11445/3930.","instname:Universidad del Rosario","reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR"],"dc:subject":["Contratos discrecionales","Percepciones de corrupción","Satisfacción laboral","Mal manejo de recursos públicos","Discretionary contracts","Corruption perceptions","Job satisfaction","Mishandling of public resources"],"dc:title":["The impact of discretionary hiring on bureaucrats' corruption perceptions, satisfaction, and the mishandling of public resources","El impacto de la contratación discrecional en las percepciones de corrupción de los burócratas, su satisfacción, y el mal uso de los recursos públicos"],"dc:type":["info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis","info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T20:47:08Z"}