{"id":{"repo_id":"rosario","oai_identifier":"oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/2416"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/rosario/oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/2416","repository":{"repo_id":"rosario","name":"Universidad del Rosario","base_url":"https://repository.urosario.edu.co/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market","abstract":"I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.","abstract_html":"I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["García Rubiano, Juan Pablo"],"institution":"Universidad del Rosario","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2009,"date_issued":"2009-12-01","date_published":"2009-12-01","updated_at":"2026-07-27T20:46:05Z","subjects":["Insurance","Adverse selection","Moral hazard","Empirical tests of contract theory","Seguros de automóviles","Seguros de responsabilidad civil","Pólizas de seguros de automóviles","Economía"],"languages":["spa"],"rights":["info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess"],"rights_urls":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["TMEC 0004 2011","http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/2416"],"render_values":[{"text":"TMEC 0004 2011","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/2416","href":"http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/2416","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_2416","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["García Rubiano, Juan Pablo"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2009-12-01","2011-05-03T17:44:13Z"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Universidad del Rosario","Facultad de Economía","Maestría en Economía"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis","info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Insurance","Adverse selection","Moral hazard","Empirical tests of contract theory","Seguros de automóviles","Seguros de responsabilidad civil","Pólizas de seguros de automóviles","Economía"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["spa"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess","http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_2416","TMEC 0004 2011","http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/2416"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf","Documento"]},{"key":"dc:source","label":"Dc Source","values":["instname:Universidad del Rosario","reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["García Rubiano, Juan Pablo"],"dc:date":["2009-12-01","2011-05-03T17:44:13Z"],"dc:description":["I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market."],"dc:format":["application/pdf","Documento"],"dc:identifier":["https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_2416","TMEC 0004 2011","http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/2416"],"dc:language":["spa"],"dc:publisher":["Universidad del Rosario","Facultad de Economía","Maestría en Economía"],"dc:rights":["info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess","http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/"],"dc:source":["instname:Universidad del Rosario","reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR"],"dc:subject":["Insurance","Adverse selection","Moral hazard","Empirical tests of contract theory","Seguros de automóviles","Seguros de responsabilidad civil","Pólizas de seguros de automóviles","Economía"],"dc:title":["Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market"],"dc:type":["info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis","info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T20:46:05Z"}