{"id":{"repo_id":"rosario","oai_identifier":"oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/13265"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/rosario/oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/13265","repository":{"repo_id":"rosario","name":"Universidad del Rosario","base_url":"https://repository.urosario.edu.co/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Exposición pública y malversación de fondos: un análisis experimental","abstract":"Este trabajo busca probar si la exposición pública afecta la propensión a tomar decisiones de malversación de recursos públicos. Se plantea un experimento de laboratorio donde las personas pueden participar de una \"actividad criminal\" (robar dinero de un fondo público) y donde cada sujeto toma esta decisión condicional a ser o no expuesto públicamente. Como resultado principal se encuentra que la exposición pública tiene un efecto negativo y significativo sobre la malversación, es decir, que cuando se introduce el riesgo de exposición pública disminuye la apropiación privada de recursos públicos.","abstract_html":"Este trabajo busca probar si la exposición pública afecta la propensión a tomar decisiones de malversación de recursos públicos. Se plantea un experimento de laboratorio donde las personas pueden participar de una "actividad criminal" (robar dinero de un fondo público) y donde cada sujeto toma esta decisión condicional a ser o no expuesto públicamente. Como resultado principal se encuentra que la exposición pública tiene un efecto negativo y significativo sobre la malversación, es decir, que cuando se introduce el riesgo de exposición pública disminuye la apropiación privada de recursos públicos.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Verbel Bustamante, Yuliet Paola"],"institution":"Maestría en economía de las políticas públicas","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-03-22","date_published":"2017-03-22","updated_at":"2026-07-27T20:46:23Z","subjects":["Exposición pública","Malversación de fondos","Corrupción","Experimento de laboratorio","Public exposure","Embezzlement","Corruption","Laboratory experiment"],"languages":["spa"],"rights":["info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess"],"rights_urls":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://repository.urosario.edu.co//handle/10336/13265"],"render_values":[{"text":"http://repository.urosario.edu.co//handle/10336/13265","href":"http://repository.urosario.edu.co//handle/10336/13265","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_13265","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Verbel Bustamante, Yuliet Paola"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2017-03-22","2017-04-17T14:07:42Z"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Maestría en economía de las políticas públicas"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis","info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Exposición pública","Malversación de fondos","Corrupción","Experimento de laboratorio","Public exposure","Embezzlement","Corruption","Laboratory experiment"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["spa"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess","http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_13265","http://repository.urosario.edu.co//handle/10336/13265"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Este trabajo busca probar si la exposición pública afecta la propensión a tomar decisiones de malversación de recursos públicos. Se plantea un experimento de laboratorio donde las personas pueden participar de una \"actividad criminal\" (robar dinero de un fondo público) y donde cada sujeto toma esta decisión condicional a ser o no expuesto públicamente. Como resultado principal se encuentra que la exposición pública tiene un efecto negativo y significativo sobre la malversación, es decir, que cuando se introduce el riesgo de exposición pública disminuye la apropiación privada de recursos públicos.","This paper analyses the effect of public exposure on embezzlement decision-making. Using a laboratory experiment where people can engage in \"criminal\" activities (stealing public money) conditional to be publicly exposed or not.The main result is a decreasing effect of revealing people identities over embezzlement, that is to say, when the risk of public exposure is introduced private apropriation of public money decreases.","Fondo de economía experimental, Universidad del Rosario"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:source","label":"Dc Source","values":["Abbink, K. (2000). Fair salaries and the moral costs of corruption. Technical report, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers.","Abbink, K. (2006). 14 laboratory experiments on corruption. International handbook on the economics of corruption, page 418.","Abbink, K. and Ellman, M. (2010). The donor problem: an experimental analysis of bene ficiary empowerment. The Journal of Development Studies, 46(8):1327-1344.","Andreoni, J. and Petrie, R. (2008). Beauty, gender and stereotypes: Evidence from laboratory experiments. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(1):73-93.","Armantier, O. and Boly, A. (2011). A controlled field experiment on corruption. European Economic Review, 55(8):1072-1082.","Azfar, O. and Nelson, W. R. (2007). Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption. Public Choice, 130(3-4):471-493.","Barr, A., Lindelow, M., and Serneels, P. M. (2004). To serve the community or oneself: the public servant's dilemma.","Barr, A. and Serra, D. (2010). Corruption and culture: An experimental analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 94(11):862-869.","Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. In The Economic Dimensions of Crime, pages 13-68. Springer.","Drugov, M., Hamman, J., and Serra, D. (2014). Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment. Experimental Economics, 17(1):78-99.","Dusek, L., Ortmann, A., and Lizal, L. (2005). Understanding corruption and corruptibility through experiments: A primer. Prague Economic Papers, 14(2):147-162.","Espectador, E. (2016). Exgobernador de la guajira, capturado por corrupción. urlhttp://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/exgobernador-de-guajiracapturado- corrupcion-articulo-667535. Accedido 28-02-2017.","Espectador, E. (2017). Oneida pinto creó una \"empresa criminal\" en la alcaldía de Albania: Fiscalía. urlhttp://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/oneida-pintocreo- una-empresa-criminal-en-la-alcaldia-de-albania-articulo-683734. Accedido 10- 03-2017.","Falk, A. and Fischbacher, U. (2002). \"crime\" in the lab-detecting social interaction. European Economic Review, 46(4):859-869.","Fergusson, L., Vargas, J. F., and Vela, M. A. (2013). Sunlight disinfects? free media in weak democracies.","Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental economics, 10(2):171-178.","Frank, B. and Schulze, G. G. (2000). Does economics make citizens corrupt? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 43(1):101-113.","Gachter, S. and Fehr, E. (1999). Collective action as a social exchange. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 39(4):341-369.","Heraldo, E. (2016). Detienen a cinco por \"apropiación\" de recursos del icbf. urlhttps://www.elheraldo.co/bolivar/detienen-cinco-por-apropiacion-de-recursosdel- icbf-309869. Accedido 10-03-2017.","Lopez, M. C., Murphy, J. J., Spraggon, J. M., and Stranlund, J. K. (2012). Comparing the efectiveness of regulation and pro-social emotions to enhance cooperation: Experimental evidence from fishing communities in colombia. Economic Inquiry, 50(1):131-142.","Mago, S. D., Samak, A. C., and Sheremeta, R. M. (2016). Facing your opponents: Social identification and information feedback in contests. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(3):459-481.","Rose-Ackerman, S. (2007). International handbook on the economics of corruption. Edward Elgar Publishing.","Savikhin, A., Sheremeta, R. M., et al. (2010). Visibility of contributions and cost of information: An experiment on public goods. Mimeograph, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.","Schulze, G. G. and Frank, B. (2003). Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility. Economics of governance, 4(2):143-160.","Zeckhauser, R. (1973). Voting systems, honest preferences and pareto optimality. American Political Science Review, 67(03):934-946.","instname:Universidad del Rosario","reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Exposición pública y malversación de fondos: un análisis experimental"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Verbel Bustamante, Yuliet Paola"],"dc:date":["2017-03-22","2017-04-17T14:07:42Z"],"dc:description":["Este trabajo busca probar si la exposición pública afecta la propensión a tomar decisiones de malversación de recursos públicos. Se plantea un experimento de laboratorio donde las personas pueden participar de una \"actividad criminal\" (robar dinero de un fondo público) y donde cada sujeto toma esta decisión condicional a ser o no expuesto públicamente. Como resultado principal se encuentra que la exposición pública tiene un efecto negativo y significativo sobre la malversación, es decir, que cuando se introduce el riesgo de exposición pública disminuye la apropiación privada de recursos públicos.","This paper analyses the effect of public exposure on embezzlement decision-making. Using a laboratory experiment where people can engage in \"criminal\" activities (stealing public money) conditional to be publicly exposed or not.The main result is a decreasing effect of revealing people identities over embezzlement, that is to say, when the risk of public exposure is introduced private apropriation of public money decreases.","Fondo de economía experimental, Universidad del Rosario"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_13265","http://repository.urosario.edu.co//handle/10336/13265"],"dc:language":["spa"],"dc:publisher":["Maestría en economía de las políticas públicas"],"dc:rights":["info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess","http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/"],"dc:source":["Abbink, K. (2000). Fair salaries and the moral costs of corruption. Technical report, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers.","Abbink, K. (2006). 14 laboratory experiments on corruption. International handbook on the economics of corruption, page 418.","Abbink, K. and Ellman, M. (2010). The donor problem: an experimental analysis of bene ficiary empowerment. The Journal of Development Studies, 46(8):1327-1344.","Andreoni, J. and Petrie, R. (2008). Beauty, gender and stereotypes: Evidence from laboratory experiments. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(1):73-93.","Armantier, O. and Boly, A. (2011). A controlled field experiment on corruption. European Economic Review, 55(8):1072-1082.","Azfar, O. and Nelson, W. R. (2007). Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption. Public Choice, 130(3-4):471-493.","Barr, A., Lindelow, M., and Serneels, P. M. (2004). To serve the community or oneself: the public servant's dilemma.","Barr, A. and Serra, D. (2010). Corruption and culture: An experimental analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 94(11):862-869.","Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. In The Economic Dimensions of Crime, pages 13-68. Springer.","Drugov, M., Hamman, J., and Serra, D. (2014). Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment. Experimental Economics, 17(1):78-99.","Dusek, L., Ortmann, A., and Lizal, L. (2005). Understanding corruption and corruptibility through experiments: A primer. Prague Economic Papers, 14(2):147-162.","Espectador, E. (2016). Exgobernador de la guajira, capturado por corrupción. urlhttp://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/exgobernador-de-guajiracapturado- corrupcion-articulo-667535. Accedido 28-02-2017.","Espectador, E. (2017). Oneida pinto creó una \"empresa criminal\" en la alcaldía de Albania: Fiscalía. urlhttp://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/oneida-pintocreo- una-empresa-criminal-en-la-alcaldia-de-albania-articulo-683734. Accedido 10- 03-2017.","Falk, A. and Fischbacher, U. (2002). \"crime\" in the lab-detecting social interaction. European Economic Review, 46(4):859-869.","Fergusson, L., Vargas, J. F., and Vela, M. A. (2013). Sunlight disinfects? free media in weak democracies.","Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental economics, 10(2):171-178.","Frank, B. and Schulze, G. G. (2000). Does economics make citizens corrupt? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 43(1):101-113.","Gachter, S. and Fehr, E. (1999). Collective action as a social exchange. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 39(4):341-369.","Heraldo, E. (2016). Detienen a cinco por \"apropiación\" de recursos del icbf. urlhttps://www.elheraldo.co/bolivar/detienen-cinco-por-apropiacion-de-recursosdel- icbf-309869. Accedido 10-03-2017.","Lopez, M. C., Murphy, J. J., Spraggon, J. M., and Stranlund, J. K. (2012). Comparing the efectiveness of regulation and pro-social emotions to enhance cooperation: Experimental evidence from fishing communities in colombia. Economic Inquiry, 50(1):131-142.","Mago, S. D., Samak, A. C., and Sheremeta, R. M. (2016). Facing your opponents: Social identification and information feedback in contests. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(3):459-481.","Rose-Ackerman, S. (2007). International handbook on the economics of corruption. Edward Elgar Publishing.","Savikhin, A., Sheremeta, R. M., et al. (2010). Visibility of contributions and cost of information: An experiment on public goods. Mimeograph, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.","Schulze, G. G. and Frank, B. (2003). Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility. Economics of governance, 4(2):143-160.","Zeckhauser, R. (1973). Voting systems, honest preferences and pareto optimality. American Political Science Review, 67(03):934-946.","instname:Universidad del Rosario","reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR"],"dc:subject":["Exposición pública","Malversación de fondos","Corrupción","Experimento de laboratorio","Public exposure","Embezzlement","Corruption","Laboratory experiment"],"dc:title":["Exposición pública y malversación de fondos: un análisis experimental"],"dc:type":["info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis","info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T20:46:23Z"}