Robert Gordon University
The anatomy of opportunism: the interplay between formal and relational approach to contracts in public private partnerships.
Abstract
dc:description.abstractThe occurrence of opportunism has been a subject of numerous studies due to its pervasive and corrosive impact on project bottom lines. This research sought to investigate the phenomenon of opportunism as typified in Public Private Partnerships frameworks in National Hospital Service (NHS) in England. By understanding what motivates opportunistic behaviour among contracting parties, practitioners are better placed to put in place measures that constraints it instead of merely understanding it. Public Private Partnership frameworks are characterised by contracts which bides parties for a prolonged duration thus compounding the problem of opportunism over contract duration. The study sought to gain insights of opportunism phenomenon from practitioners' perspective therefore providing a perspective hitherto unexplored. The aim was to gain a more nuanced perspective through reflection of current practices and consequently informing future contract designs, contract management practices, training and capacity building. The study was qualitative, and data was obtained from interviewing participants who were selected purposively. The sampling method was used to ensure that detailed data was obtained from those best able to provide it. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with ten participants working in PPP frameworks in NHS. An Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) methodological framework was adopted as a means of collecting and analysing data. Using NVivo as a tool of segregating data, four key or superordinate themes emerged. The first three revealed the perceived drivers of opportunism while the fourth explored constraining mechanism through relational contractual engagement. The findings suggest that PPP contract design particularly its textual attributes significantly contributed to existence and practices of opportunism in the framework. The design attributes rendered the contract inflexible, reduced transparency, exposed parties to information asymmetry and in turn provided a fertile ground for opportunistic behaviour. Furthermore, the findings show that contract administrative and management processes were often given lower priority thus exacerbating the problem of opportunism. The subthemes that emerged from this theme suggest that the administrative processes involved complex change management, the processes experienced capacity issues and misalignment of parties aims and objectives often came in the way of achieving better results. Findings also show that the safeguards against opportunism achieved mixed outcomes and therefore unreliable as opportunism constraining mechanism. While contract monitoring and control achieved some success, market testing for Value for Money was ambiguous and deficient in accuracy due to shortcomings of modelling data used to set it in the first place. Finally, the theme of relational engagement as a constraining mechanism was examined and findings show that while most participants acknowledged its potential to reduce conflicts and opportunistic behaviour, few were willing to use it in their respective situations for fear of perceived ack of enforceability. Thus, industry culture and practices that gave detailed contract primacy over relations of mutual trust reduced the overall effectiveness of relational contractual engagement. The findings were then triangulated against existing literature to establish the credibility of the findings leading to research conclusions and recommendations.
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
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- Muturi, Simon Gitagama
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
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- D. Moore, D. Christie and B. Bjeirmi
Subjects
dc:subject × 9Rights
- Language dc:language
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
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oai:rgu-repository.worktribe.com:3020396
https://doi.org/10.48526/rgu-wt-3020396 - OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:rgu-repository.worktribe.com:3020396