{"id":{"repo_id":"regina","oai_identifier":"oai:uregina.scholaris.ca:10294/16064"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/regina/oai:uregina.scholaris.ca:10294/16064","repository":{"repo_id":"regina","name":"University of Regina","base_url":"https://uregina.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Human dignity and intellectual disability: Thinking with Beauvoir over the influence of the Kantian view","abstract":"“Kant is generally taken to be the locus situ of the intimate connection between personhood, dignity, and autonomy” (Kittay and Carlson 2010, 4). In this thesis, I consider how the Kantian view of morality influenced the creation of a framework for our concepts and treatment of human dignity which contributes to the discrimination of people with intellectual disabilities. I will argue that we need to conceptualize human dignity outside of a framework of autonomous agency because it becomes exclusive of some people with intellectual disabilities. Guided by the thought of Simone de Beauvoir I attempt to formulate, instead, a phenomenological-existential model of human dignity, to approach the concept in a way that includes all human beings, and thus of necessity, people with intellectual disabilities. Beauvoir uses a concept of ontological freedom, which I believe is a suitable and solid ground for us to consider dignity for everyone. She argues that each human freedom carries responsibility (Beauvoir 1948, 15) and is tied to the freedom of other individuals (Beauvoir 1948, 17). Such a tie to others is so fundamental to human beings that I need others to realize my own freedom (Beauvoir 1948, 72). After presenting a brief overview of the Kantian formulation of human dignity, I present the existential notions of ambiguity, situatedness, intentionality, and of freedom as responsibility, through Beauvoir’s lens. By doing so, I offer an existential background for the project of an alternative for a model for conceiving of human dignity that is unlike the dominant Kantian model, which I present at the conclusion of this thesis. In a Beauvoirean way, the needs that intellectually disabled people possess are not out of the ordinary for what we understand about human freedom. My philosophical conception of human dignity is that it is both a quality and a capacity: the former as a cause, which flows from our existence, for which I say that dignity is the worthiness of existing in being human; the latter as a capacity to be externally recognized and attended to by others. I argue that our concept of human dignity needs to reflect the situatedness of different people in their own particularity, including the particularities of intellectual ability and disability.","abstract_html":"“Kant is generally taken to be the locus situ of the intimate connection between personhood, dignity, and autonomy” (Kittay and Carlson 2010, 4). In this thesis, I consider how the Kantian view of morality influenced the creation of a framework for our concepts and treatment of human dignity which contributes to the discrimination of people with intellectual disabilities. I will argue that we need to conceptualize human dignity outside of a framework of autonomous agency because it becomes exclusive of some people with intellectual disabilities. Guided by the thought of Simone de Beauvoir I attempt to formulate, instead, a phenomenological-existential model of human dignity, to approach the concept in a way that includes all human beings, and thus of necessity, people with intellectual disabilities. Beauvoir uses a concept of ontological freedom, which I believe is a suitable and solid ground for us to consider dignity for everyone. She argues that each human freedom carries responsibility (Beauvoir 1948, 15) and is tied to the freedom of other individuals (Beauvoir 1948, 17). Such a tie to others is so fundamental to human beings that I need others to realize my own freedom (Beauvoir 1948, 72). After presenting a brief overview of the Kantian formulation of human dignity, I present the existential notions of ambiguity, situatedness, intentionality, and of freedom as responsibility, through Beauvoir’s lens. By doing so, I offer an existential background for the project of an alternative for a model for conceiving of human dignity that is unlike the dominant Kantian model, which I present at the conclusion of this thesis. In a Beauvoirean way, the needs that intellectually disabled people possess are not out of the ordinary for what we understand about human freedom. My philosophical conception of human dignity is that it is both a quality and a capacity: the former as a cause, which flows from our existence, for which I say that dignity is the worthiness of existing in being human; the latter as a capacity to be externally recognized and attended to by others. I argue that our concept of human dignity needs to reflect the situatedness of different people in their own particularity, including the particularities of intellectual ability and disability.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Dos Santos, Marco Aurélio"],"institution":"Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Regina","degree_name":"Master of Arts (MA)","degree_level":"Master's","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Mudde, Anna"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Piercey, Robert"],"year":2022,"date_issued":"2022-12","date_published":"2022-12","updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:03:45Z","subjects":[],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.82465/4832"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.82465/4832","href":"https://doi.org/10.82465/4832","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10294/16064","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Mudde, Anna"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Piercey, Robert"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Dos Santos, Marco Aurélio"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2023-07-17T20:49:25Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2023-07-17T20:49:25Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2022-12"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Regina"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["master thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Master's"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts (MA)"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Regina"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.82465/4832"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/10294/16064"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy, University of Regina. ix, 77 p."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["“Kant is generally taken to be the locus situ of the intimate connection between personhood, dignity, and autonomy” (Kittay and Carlson 2010, 4). In this thesis, I consider how the Kantian view of morality influenced the creation of a framework for our concepts and treatment of human dignity which contributes to the discrimination of people with intellectual disabilities. I will argue that we need to conceptualize human dignity outside of a framework of autonomous agency because it becomes exclusive of some people with intellectual disabilities. Guided by the thought of Simone de Beauvoir I attempt to formulate, instead, a phenomenological-existential model of human dignity, to approach the concept in a way that includes all human beings, and thus of necessity, people with intellectual disabilities. Beauvoir uses a concept of ontological freedom, which I believe is a suitable and solid ground for us to consider dignity for everyone. She argues that each human freedom carries responsibility (Beauvoir 1948, 15) and is tied to the freedom of other individuals (Beauvoir 1948, 17). Such a tie to others is so fundamental to human beings that I need others to realize my own freedom (Beauvoir 1948, 72). After presenting a brief overview of the Kantian formulation of human dignity, I present the existential notions of ambiguity, situatedness, intentionality, and of freedom as responsibility, through Beauvoir’s lens. By doing so, I offer an existential background for the project of an alternative for a model for conceiving of human dignity that is unlike the dominant Kantian model, which I present at the conclusion of this thesis. In a Beauvoirean way, the needs that intellectually disabled people possess are not out of the ordinary for what we understand about human freedom. My philosophical conception of human dignity is that it is both a quality and a capacity: the former as a cause, which flows from our existence, for which I say that dignity is the worthiness of existing in being human; the latter as a capacity to be externally recognized and attended to by others. I argue that our concept of human dignity needs to reflect the situatedness of different people in their own particularity, including the particularities of intellectual ability and disability."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Human dignity and intellectual disability: Thinking with Beauvoir over the influence of the Kantian view"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Mudde, Anna"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Piercey, Robert"],"dc:creator":["Dos Santos, Marco Aurélio"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2023-07-17T20:49:25Z"],"dc:date.available":["2023-07-17T20:49:25Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2022-12"],"dc:description":["A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy, University of Regina. ix, 77 p."],"dc:description.abstract":["“Kant is generally taken to be the locus situ of the intimate connection between personhood, dignity, and autonomy” (Kittay and Carlson 2010, 4). In this thesis, I consider how the Kantian view of morality influenced the creation of a framework for our concepts and treatment of human dignity which contributes to the discrimination of people with intellectual disabilities. I will argue that we need to conceptualize human dignity outside of a framework of autonomous agency because it becomes exclusive of some people with intellectual disabilities. Guided by the thought of Simone de Beauvoir I attempt to formulate, instead, a phenomenological-existential model of human dignity, to approach the concept in a way that includes all human beings, and thus of necessity, people with intellectual disabilities. Beauvoir uses a concept of ontological freedom, which I believe is a suitable and solid ground for us to consider dignity for everyone. She argues that each human freedom carries responsibility (Beauvoir 1948, 15) and is tied to the freedom of other individuals (Beauvoir 1948, 17). Such a tie to others is so fundamental to human beings that I need others to realize my own freedom (Beauvoir 1948, 72). After presenting a brief overview of the Kantian formulation of human dignity, I present the existential notions of ambiguity, situatedness, intentionality, and of freedom as responsibility, through Beauvoir’s lens. By doing so, I offer an existential background for the project of an alternative for a model for conceiving of human dignity that is unlike the dominant Kantian model, which I present at the conclusion of this thesis. In a Beauvoirean way, the needs that intellectually disabled people possess are not out of the ordinary for what we understand about human freedom. My philosophical conception of human dignity is that it is both a quality and a capacity: the former as a cause, which flows from our existence, for which I say that dignity is the worthiness of existing in being human; the latter as a capacity to be externally recognized and attended to by others. I argue that our concept of human dignity needs to reflect the situatedness of different people in their own particularity, including the particularities of intellectual ability and disability."],"dc:identifier.doi":["https://doi.org/10.82465/4832"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/10294/16064"],"dc:language.iso":["en"],"dc:publisher":["Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Regina"],"dc:title":["Human dignity and intellectual disability: Thinking with Beauvoir over the influence of the Kantian view"],"dc:type":["master thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Master's"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts (MA)"],"thesis:institution_name":["Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Regina"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:03:45Z"}