{"id":{"repo_id":"radboud","oai_identifier":"oai:repository.ubn.ru.nl:2066/309681"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/radboud/oai:repository.ubn.ru.nl:2066/309681","repository":{"repo_id":"radboud","name":"Radboud University Nijmegen","base_url":"https://repository.ubn.ru.nl/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"High-Assurance Protections of Crypto Software against Micro-Architectural Leakage","abstract":"Contains fulltext : 309681.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)","abstract_html":"Contains fulltext : 309681.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Ammanaghatta Shivakumar, B."],"institution":"S.l. : s.n.","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Schwabe, P.","Barthe, G."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024","date_published":"2024","updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:02:27Z","subjects":["Digital Security"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2066/309681","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Schwabe, P.","Barthe, G."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Ammanaghatta Shivakumar, B."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2024"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["S.l. : s.n."]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Doctoral thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Digital Security"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://repository.ubn.ru.nl//bitstream/handle/2066/309681/309681.pdf","https://hdl.handle.net/2066/309681"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Contains fulltext : 309681.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)","As today's world tends to move towards digitalization, the primary goal of the software is to provide security apart from functional correctness. A program produces visible effects in various forms like timing variations, power consumption, etc. during its execution. These visible effects are termed “side-channel effects\", and attacks based on observing them are termed “side-channel attacks.\" A popular methodology to ensure mitigation against these kinds of attacks is to write programs that always produce the same visible effects when executed on different inputs. A computer can only execute the binaries, and hence, making only a high-level program secure against “side-channel attacks\" is not end-to-end protection. It is important to either design a compiler that preserves security properties or enforce mitigation at lower level. These approaches come with its own cost based on amount of effort needed or its complexity. Designing a secure compiler is an intensive task as each pass of the compiler needs to be enforced to preserve the property. Enforcing mitigation at low level is harder than at the source level because a lot of information is lost through compilation process. This thesis explores timing-based micro-architectural attacks and various kinds of techniques on how to protect against them.","Radboud University, 23 september 2024","Promotores : Schwabe, P., Barthe, G.","xii, 151 p."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["High-Assurance Protections of Crypto Software against Micro-Architectural Leakage"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Schwabe, P.","Barthe, G."],"dc:creator":["Ammanaghatta Shivakumar, B."],"dc:date":["2024"],"dc:description":["Contains fulltext : 309681.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)","As today's world tends to move towards digitalization, the primary goal of the software is to provide security apart from functional correctness. A program produces visible effects in various forms like timing variations, power consumption, etc. during its execution. These visible effects are termed “side-channel effects\", and attacks based on observing them are termed “side-channel attacks.\" A popular methodology to ensure mitigation against these kinds of attacks is to write programs that always produce the same visible effects when executed on different inputs. A computer can only execute the binaries, and hence, making only a high-level program secure against “side-channel attacks\" is not end-to-end protection. It is important to either design a compiler that preserves security properties or enforce mitigation at lower level. These approaches come with its own cost based on amount of effort needed or its complexity. Designing a secure compiler is an intensive task as each pass of the compiler needs to be enforced to preserve the property. Enforcing mitigation at low level is harder than at the source level because a lot of information is lost through compilation process. 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