Epistemic Responsibility in Echo Chambers

The creation of the internet has drastically changed the way we epistemically interact with the world. While this is largely a boon to gaining knowledge or belief, it also offers up a plethora of epistemic challenges that ought to attract our attention. One pressing issue concerns echo chambers, which, while not unique to the online episteme, are proliferated in pervasive ways online. Specifically, echo chambers manipulate trust dynamics in such a way that makes finding people epistemically responsible difficult, as contrary evidence is systematically dismissed, leaving the individual in a precarious epistemic position. Despite feeling sympathy for the victims of an echo chamber, there is a strong intuition that they should be responsible for pernicious beliefs. I suggest that this tension between sympathy and responsibility can be resolved through a character-based approach, where one's beliefs are tied to their character due to the internalization of the norms of the echo chamber. This has epistemic utility in the form of a social heuristic, which not only acts as a pragmatic form of responsibility but also operates as a valuable epistemic tool for navigating the epistemic commons that we all rely on.

Department dc:contributor.department

Philosophy

Year dc:date.issued

2025

Author dc:creator

• Bissonette, Xavier Cain

Advisor dc:contributor.supervisor

• Paul, Elliot

• Social Epistemology
• Responsibility
• Echo Chambers
• Social Media
• Epistemic Vice

Statement dc:rights

• Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/1974/35302

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:queensu.scholaris.ca:1974/35302