Detecting Earnings Information in Repurchase Announcements using the Luck of the (Double) Irish

Previous studies disagree about whether open market repurchase announcements contain information about earnings expectations. Using a regulation that made tax haven-using firms’ repurchases more costly as a quasi-natural experiment, I find positive post-repurchase-announcement revisions in earnings expectations for firms using “Double Irish” offshore tax avoidance structures. These results are robust to falsification tests, different types of tax havens, and changes in forecasted and actual earnings. “Double Irish” firms announce fewer repurchase programs than other firms after the regulation, consistent with an increase in their repurchasing costs. These results suggest that certain costly repurchases are announced when outsiders underestimate future earnings.

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Management

Year

2015

Author dc:creator

• O'Brien, William

Contributors dc:contributor

• Mara Faccio
• Huseyin Gulen
• Byoung Hwang
• John McConnell

Repository record dc:identifier

https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations/1137

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:docs.lib.purdue.edu:open_access_dissertations-2353