Three Essays on Intra-Creditor Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructuring
type: CreativeWork
description: This work is comprised of three essays that attempt to contribute to the task of reviewing the prevailing (solely market-based) contractual approach for sovereign debt restructuring. These essays particularly focus on aspects of intra-creditor coordination. Although the content of these essays is interconnected, each unit is a stand-alone entity. Essay I: The latest Argentinean debt restructuring was the first time the resolution of a modern financial crisis was completely handed over to the private financial markets without official intervention by public institutions. This essay argues that the resulting harshest haircut for private creditors in history can be at least partially related to an assurance game played by creditors. It shows that incentive schemes provided by the Argentinean government were factors facilitating this haircut. The analysis suggests that, contrary to the recognition in the literature, the effects of Collective Action Clauses and Exit Consents within a restructuring process are not equal. In the case of Argentina, the inclusion of Collective Action Clauses in the defaulted bonds could have benefited the holdout creditors. Essay II: Experience from events of sovereign debt restructuring over the last decade shows that the prevailing process is mainly shaped by exchange-offers launched by the debtor. This suggests that negotiations for changing the repayment terms of the debt take place in an ultimatum game which centers virtually all bargaining power on the debtor side. Creditors vote according to reservations values that might be influenced by fairness consideration both vis-à-vis the debtor and their fellow creditors. And, as fairness is usually a highly subjective influence, this can result in a heterogeneity of reservation values which might impede effective intra-creditor coordination for the benefit of the debtor. Essay III: Mitigating intra-creditor coordination failures has always been crucial in any proposal for an institutionalize…
abstract: This work is comprised of three essays that attempt to contribute to the task of reviewing the prevailing (solely market-based) contractual approach for sovereign debt restructuring. These essays particularly focus on aspects of intra-creditor coordination. Although the content of these essays is interconnected, each unit is a stand-alone entity. Essay I: The latest Argentinean debt restructuring was the first time the resolution of a modern financial crisis was completely handed over to the private financial markets without official intervention by public institutions. This essay argues that the resulting harshest haircut for private creditors in history can be at least partially related to an assurance game played by creditors. It shows that incentive schemes provided by the Argentinean government were factors facilitating this haircut. The analysis suggests that, contrary to the recognition in the literature, the effects of Collective Action Clauses and Exit Consents within a restructuring process are not equal. In the case of Argentina, the inclusion of Collective Action Clauses in the defaulted bonds could have benefited the holdout creditors. Essay II: Experience from events of sovereign debt restructuring over the last decade shows that the prevailing process is mainly shaped by exchange-offers launched by the debtor. This suggests that negotiations for changing the repayment terms of the debt take place in an ultimatum game which centers virtually all bargaining power on the debtor side. Creditors vote according to reservations values that might be influenced by fairness consideration both vis-à-vis the debtor and their fellow creditors. And, as fairness is usually a highly subjective influence, this can result in a heterogeneity of reservation values which might impede effective intra-creditor coordination for the benefit of the debtor. Essay III: Mitigating intra-creditor coordination failures has always been crucial in any proposal for an institutionalize…
author: Engelen, Christian
keywords: Umschuldungsverhandlungen, Koordinationsfehler, Vertraglicher Ansatz, Internationale Finanzarchitektur, Emerging Market Staatsanleihen, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Coordination Failures, Contractual Approach, International Financial Architecture, Emerging Market Bonds
date published: 2008-04-18
date modified: 2026-07-24T03:44:57Z
provider: Universität Passau
publisher: Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
type: WebPage
source organization: Universität Passau