Three Essays on Moral Self-Regulation of Honesty and Impression Management
In study 1 an introduction to the research on moral self-regulation is provided alongside with an explanation of the two manifestations of moral self-regulation: moral licensing and moral cleansing. At the core of the first study is an experiment which was designed to identify moral licensing and cleansing in the domain of honesty. The experiment merges relevant studies from social psychology and experimental economics. It assesses the question if moral self-regulation exists within the domain of honesty or more precisely, if the truth and lies are told in such a way as to balance each other out. After manipulating participants’ moral balances (either positively or negatively), rates of truth-telling are compared to a neutral baseline scenario. Since neither moral licensing nor moral cleansing is observed, the results provide no support to the initial hypothesis that moral self-regulation exists within the domain of honesty. Study 2 builds on these results and discusses possible reasons for the absence of moral self-regulation. The research on moral hypocrisy and self-concept maintenance are presented and discussed as possible explanations. In order to shed more light on participants’ behavior, a coding procedure is presented that was used on the dataset from study 1. This approach makes it possible to quantify participants’ handwritten stories that resulted from the moral manipulation in study 1 and gain more insights on how truth-telling and lying affect the moral balance. By analyzing (dis)honesty on a more detailed level, results show that participants tend to act consistent to what they revealed about themselves in their stories. Study 3 links together aspects of moral self-regulation, moral hypocrisy and impression management. The "looting game" is presented which lets participants loot money from a charity box being subject to altruistic punishment from observers. For their punishment decision observers are provided with a history of participants’ past actions. This design allows to assess how misconduct, punishment and the creation of a favorable impression interact and ultimately impact profits. The results indicate that moral cleansing, and not the desire to trick observers, is the reason for manipulation. Participants who loot money from the charity box do not expect to receive less punishment, rather they simply want to present a more favorable picture of themselves. On the other hand, observers fully account for the possibility of manipulation and tend to disregard a manipulated history. The looting game therefore brings the hypothesis into question that impressions are managed and manipulated to increase profits.
moral licensing, moral cleansing, dishonesty, self-image, altruistic punishment
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