Code Injection Vulnerabilities in Web Applications - Exemplified at Cross-site Scripting

The majority of all security problems in today's Web applications is caused by string-based code injection, with Cross-site Scripting (XSS)being the dominant representative of this vulnerability class. This thesis discusses XSS and suggests defense mechanisms. We do so in three stages: First, we conduct a thorough analysis of JavaScript's capabilities and explain how these capabilities are utilized in XSS attacks. We subsequently design a systematic, hierarchical classification of XSS payloads. In addition, we present a comprehensive survey of publicly documented XSS payloads which is structured according to our proposed classification scheme. Secondly, we explore defensive mechanisms which dynamically prevent the execution of some payload types without eliminating the actual vulnerability. More specifically, we discuss the design and implementation of countermeasures against the XSS payloads Session Hijacking'', Cross-site Request Forgery'', and attacks that target intranet resources. We build upon this and introduce a general methodology for developing such countermeasures: We determine a necessary set of basic capabilities an adversary needs for successfully executing an attack through an analysis of the targeted payload type. The resulting countermeasure relies on revoking one of these capabilities, which in turn renders the payload infeasible. Finally, we present two language-based approaches that prevent XSS and related vulnerabilities: We identify the implicit mixing of data and code during string-based syntax assembly as the root cause of string-based code injection attacks. Consequently, we explore data/code separation in web applications. For this purpose, we propose a novel methodology for token-level data/code partitioning of a computer language's syntactical elements. This forms the basis for our two distinct techniques: For one, we present an approach to detect data/code confusion on run-time and demonstrate how this can be used for attack prevention. Furthermore, we show how vulnerabilities can be avoided through altering the underlying programming language. We introduce a dedicated datatype for syntax assembly instead of using string datatypes themselves for this purpose. We develop a formal, type-theoretical model of the proposed datatype and proof that it provides reliable separation between data and code hence, preventing code injection vulnerabilities. We verify our approach's applicability utilizing a practical implementation for the J2EE application server.

Level thesis:degree_level

thesis.doctoral

Grantor dc:publisher

Universität Passau

Year

2009

Author dc:creator

• Johns, Martin

Contributors dc:contributor

• Posegga, Joachim

• XSS
• SQL Injection
• Security
• Web

Statement dc:rights

• Standardbedingung laut Einverständniserklärung

Repository record source_url

https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-uni-passau/frontdoor/index/index/docId/144

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:kobv.de-opus4-uni-passau:144