Functionalism and Strange Minds

This Paper details arguements surrounding the functionalism thesis in philosophy of mind, seeking to expand, critique, and clarify sections of the arguement with a special attention made to the physical constraints on what constitutes a sufficient realizer, the difficulties in multiple realizability, and the interpretation therein. This paper firstly demonstrates the functionalist arguement, its precedents, and the work of hillary putnam, secondly it proposes the myriad physical effects that change the functionality of certain realizers detailing transit time, realizer decay, and the situation of functionalist minds as physical objects. Following this the paper argues a number of thought experiments, including discussion on the minds of octopodes, the science fiction mind of "Solaris" and my own thought experiment as "the junkyard mind". In the paper their is discussion of the extended mind thesis as well as interpretationism in attempting to produce a version of functionalism that still works, but is necessarily more complicated.

Grantor dc:publisher

Oxford Brookes University

Year dc:date

2023

Author dc:creator

• Christie, Miles

Contributors dc:contributor

• O'Brien, Dan

Statement dc:rights

• All rights reserved

Language dc:language

en

DOI dc:identifier

https://doi.org/10.24384/n29j-5770

OAI identifier oai:identifier

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