The Pragmatic Problem of Evil

This paper consists of two parts, namely, “Is the Landscape of the Problem of Evil at an Impasse?” and “A Pragmatic Argument against Reliance in God to Prevent Horrendous Evils.” The first part of this paper completes an analysis of formulations around the problem of evil, analysis of logical and evidential arguments from evil, and analysis of theist responses to the problem of evil. Within the first part, I establish that certain arguments from evil are not valid, so they will not convince the theist. In response to those which are however, the theist does not convince the atheist to abandon the problem of evil. Sceptical theism allows the theist to remain unconvinced by the problem of evil and immune to any evidential argument from evil. Due to colliding atheist and theist principles, there is an impasse in the debate. The second part of this paper aims to take a more pragmatic approach to the problem of evil. Rather than focusing on debate and conjecture within the landscape of the problem of evil, this paper seeks to establish a common idea that theists and atheists will be able to hold. Both atheists and theists seek to eliminate evil. Within the second part of the paper, I establish that reliance in God alone to prevent horrendous evils is an unreasonable action. I do this through an analysis and application of pragmatism and Humean thought to the problem of evil. The application is largely based around naturalist background assumptions which atheists and theists will all hold, and how these assumptions inform us of what actions may be reasonable and unreasonable.

Grantor dc:publisher

Oxford Brookes University

Year dc:date

2021

Author dc:creator

• Cooper, Matthew James

Contributors dc:contributor

• O'Brien, Daniel

Statement dc:rights

• All rights reserved

Language dc:language

en

DOI dc:identifier

https://doi.org/10.24384/3mx3-sg37

OAI identifier oai:identifier

tle:d2820bb6-42d5-48b4-90ae-5fa5cb609513:d6bd9758-527a-46cd-bfe2-c433766e8fca:1