{"id":{"repo_id":"oxford-brookes","oai_identifier":"tle:d18b6066-a6da-4c93-a39a-87065a74138e:d6bd9758-527a-46cd-bfe2-c433766e8fca:1"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/oxford-brookes/tle:d18b6066-a6da-4c93-a39a-87065a74138e:d6bd9758-527a-46cd-bfe2-c433766e8fca:1","repository":{"repo_id":"oxford-brookes","name":"Oxford Brookes University","base_url":"https://radar.brookes.ac.uk/radar/oai"},"display":{"title":"Error theory after J.L Mackie: Contemporary error theorists’ arguments","abstract":"This dissertation will be exploring the arguments in favour of moral error theory, which is the metaethical theory that refers to moral statements as erroneous. Error theory relies on the idea that moral statements aim towards the truth, but as there are no moral properties that exist, so moral statements are systematically false. After defining moral error theory, I will then outline J.L Mackie’s account of error theory, including his two arguments against moral realism: the argument from relativity and the argument from queerness. In consideration of the arguments against Mackie’s error theory, I will explore three contemporary error theorists' ideas that have elaborated from Mackie’s arguments or have provided more compelling arguments in defence of error theory. The three error theorists that I will examine are Richard Joyce, Jonas Olson, and Bart Streumer. According to Joyce, Mackie’s queerness argument feels incomplete and provides a queerness argument, the argument from non-institutionality. Furthermore, Joyce answers the consequences of first-order ethics if error theory is true with his theory of moral fictionalism. Olson also formulates a queerness theory that is known as the argument from normative irreducibility. Olson also provides an answer for the consequences if error theory is true with his theory on conservationism. Finally, Bart Streumer defends a global error theory, which is vastly different to Joyce and Olson, with an objection to the belief problem to assert we can still support error theory without the ability to believe in it. In the third chapter, I will evaluate the three contemporary error theorists concerning their queerness arguments raised by Joyce and Olson and the unbelievability argument raised by Streumer. Also, there will be a discussion on the most plausible theory to retain normative judgements if error theory is true. I will do this by evaluating moral fictionalism and conservationism. Key words: moral error theory, Mackie, Joyce, Olson, Streumer, normative error theory, epistemic error theory, non-institutionality, irreducible normativity, unbelievability, abolitionism, fictionalism, conservationism, substitutionism.","abstract_html":"This dissertation will be exploring the arguments in favour of moral error theory, which is the metaethical theory that refers to moral statements as erroneous. Error theory relies on the idea that moral statements aim towards the truth, but as there are no moral properties that exist, so moral statements are systematically false. After defining moral error theory, I will then outline J.L Mackie’s account of error theory, including his two arguments against moral realism: the argument from relativity and the argument from queerness. In consideration of the arguments against Mackie’s error theory, I will explore three contemporary error theorists' ideas that have elaborated from Mackie’s arguments or have provided more compelling arguments in defence of error theory. The three error theorists that I will examine are Richard Joyce, Jonas Olson, and Bart Streumer. According to Joyce, Mackie’s queerness argument feels incomplete and provides a queerness argument, the argument from non-institutionality. Furthermore, Joyce answers the consequences of first-order ethics if error theory is true with his theory of moral fictionalism. Olson also formulates a queerness theory that is known as the argument from normative irreducibility. Olson also provides an answer for the consequences if error theory is true with his theory on conservationism. Finally, Bart Streumer defends a global error theory, which is vastly different to Joyce and Olson, with an objection to the belief problem to assert we can still support error theory without the ability to believe in it. In the third chapter, I will evaluate the three contemporary error theorists concerning their queerness arguments raised by Joyce and Olson and the unbelievability argument raised by Streumer. Also, there will be a discussion on the most plausible theory to retain normative judgements if error theory is true. I will do this by evaluating moral fictionalism and conservationism. Key words: moral error theory, Mackie, Joyce, Olson, Streumer, normative error theory, epistemic error theory, non-institutionality, irreducible normativity, unbelievability, abolitionism, fictionalism, conservationism, substitutionism.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Fuszard, Georgina"],"institution":"Oxford Brookes University","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Boulter, Stephen"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2022,"date_issued":"2022","date_published":"2022","updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:43:33Z","subjects":[],"languages":["en"],"rights":["All rights reserved"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.24384/rtwn-jz40","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Fuszard, Georgina","Boulter, Stephen"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Fuszard, Georgina"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2022"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Oxford Brookes University"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["thesis"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["All rights reserved"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://doi.org/10.24384/rtwn-jz40","https://radar.brookes.ac.uk/radar/file/d18b6066-a6da-4c93-a39a-87065a74138e/1/Error theory after Mackie - MA - 2022 - Fuszard.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This dissertation will be exploring the arguments in favour of moral error theory, which is the metaethical theory that refers to moral statements as erroneous. Error theory relies on the idea that moral statements aim towards the truth, but as there are no moral properties that exist, so moral statements are systematically false. After defining moral error theory, I will then outline J.L Mackie’s account of error theory, including his two arguments against moral realism: the argument from relativity and the argument from queerness. In consideration of the arguments against Mackie’s error theory, I will explore three contemporary error theorists' ideas that have elaborated from Mackie’s arguments or have provided more compelling arguments in defence of error theory. The three error theorists that I will examine are Richard Joyce, Jonas Olson, and Bart Streumer. According to Joyce, Mackie’s queerness argument feels incomplete and provides a queerness argument, the argument from non-institutionality. Furthermore, Joyce answers the consequences of first-order ethics if error theory is true with his theory of moral fictionalism. Olson also formulates a queerness theory that is known as the argument from normative irreducibility. Olson also provides an answer for the consequences if error theory is true with his theory on conservationism. Finally, Bart Streumer defends a global error theory, which is vastly different to Joyce and Olson, with an objection to the belief problem to assert we can still support error theory without the ability to believe in it. In the third chapter, I will evaluate the three contemporary error theorists concerning their queerness arguments raised by Joyce and Olson and the unbelievability argument raised by Streumer. Also, there will be a discussion on the most plausible theory to retain normative judgements if error theory is true. I will do this by evaluating moral fictionalism and conservationism. Key words: moral error theory, Mackie, Joyce, Olson, Streumer, normative error theory, epistemic error theory, non-institutionality, irreducible normativity, unbelievability, abolitionism, fictionalism, conservationism, substitutionism."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Error theory after J.L Mackie: Contemporary error theorists’ arguments"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Fuszard, Georgina","Boulter, Stephen"],"dc:creator":["Fuszard, Georgina"],"dc:date":["2022"],"dc:description":["This dissertation will be exploring the arguments in favour of moral error theory, which is the metaethical theory that refers to moral statements as erroneous. Error theory relies on the idea that moral statements aim towards the truth, but as there are no moral properties that exist, so moral statements are systematically false. After defining moral error theory, I will then outline J.L Mackie’s account of error theory, including his two arguments against moral realism: the argument from relativity and the argument from queerness. In consideration of the arguments against Mackie’s error theory, I will explore three contemporary error theorists' ideas that have elaborated from Mackie’s arguments or have provided more compelling arguments in defence of error theory. The three error theorists that I will examine are Richard Joyce, Jonas Olson, and Bart Streumer. According to Joyce, Mackie’s queerness argument feels incomplete and provides a queerness argument, the argument from non-institutionality. Furthermore, Joyce answers the consequences of first-order ethics if error theory is true with his theory of moral fictionalism. Olson also formulates a queerness theory that is known as the argument from normative irreducibility. Olson also provides an answer for the consequences if error theory is true with his theory on conservationism. Finally, Bart Streumer defends a global error theory, which is vastly different to Joyce and Olson, with an objection to the belief problem to assert we can still support error theory without the ability to believe in it. In the third chapter, I will evaluate the three contemporary error theorists concerning their queerness arguments raised by Joyce and Olson and the unbelievability argument raised by Streumer. Also, there will be a discussion on the most plausible theory to retain normative judgements if error theory is true. I will do this by evaluating moral fictionalism and conservationism. Key words: moral error theory, Mackie, Joyce, Olson, Streumer, normative error theory, epistemic error theory, non-institutionality, irreducible normativity, unbelievability, abolitionism, fictionalism, conservationism, substitutionism."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://doi.org/10.24384/rtwn-jz40","https://radar.brookes.ac.uk/radar/file/d18b6066-a6da-4c93-a39a-87065a74138e/1/Error theory after Mackie - MA - 2022 - Fuszard.pdf"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:publisher":["Oxford Brookes University"],"dc:rights":["All rights reserved"],"dc:title":["Error theory after J.L Mackie: Contemporary error theorists’ arguments"],"dc:type":["thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:43:33Z"}