A Philosophical Re-evaluation of the Problem of Evil: Framing an Embedded Analytic Approach

In this thesis I address the theological problem of evil, defining the concept of moral evil and morally-evil acts. I develop a specific method to address the problem, one I call the embedded analytic method. This method allows me to turn for evidence to the social sciences, the humanities and the exact sciences when these are relevant and allows me to listen to and incorporate the testimonies of both victims and perpetrators of evil acts in my analysis. I argue that evil acts are a distinct category from bad acts and describe their multi-layered consequences as event horizons, using a concept borrowed from astrophysics. I redefine moral evil as the predation of one person upon another and argue that instead of the choice between good and evil humans face a tripartite choice among good, bad and evil. My examination of both individual and collective evil acts had yielded the conclusion that the dynamics of predation underlies acts of moral evil. I further argue that evil is an uncommon and an unusual choice, addressing free-will arguments from the Augustinian tradition. I discuss the motivation for predatory acts and develop the concept of relational economies, the social and relational contexts within which both individual and collective evil acts take place. I conclude the thesis with a discussion of the relationship between God and evil acts and argue that neither one of the two choices available to God to prevent acts of moral evil from occurring is beneficial given its eventual consequences.

Grantor dc:publisher

Oxford Brookes University

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Shallan, Esther

Contributors dc:contributor

• Clack, Beverley
• Cain, Mark

Statement dc:rights

• All rights reserved

Language dc:language

en

DOI dc:identifier

https://doi.org/10.24384/1p1e-ef82

OAI identifier oai:identifier

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