{"id":{"repo_id":"oxford-brookes","oai_identifier":"tle:856327bf-2c7d-4fae-9311-35c6c5717da1:d6bd9758-527a-46cd-bfe2-c433766e8fca:1"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/oxford-brookes/tle:856327bf-2c7d-4fae-9311-35c6c5717da1:d6bd9758-527a-46cd-bfe2-c433766e8fca:1","repository":{"repo_id":"oxford-brookes","name":"Oxford Brookes University","base_url":"https://radar.brookes.ac.uk/radar/oai"},"display":{"title":"Is Ancient Eudaimonism a Defensible Normative Ethical Position?","abstract":"An overview of the nature of virtue ethics from Rosalind Hursthouse will be presented, alongside an account from Christine Swanton of the differentia which distinguish eudaimonism from virtue ethics in general. This will be followed by an account of Julia Annas’ analysis of the structural features of Ancient eudaimonist theories of virtue ethics, focusing especially on the relationship between virtue and happiness. Three different accounts of the relationship between virtue and happiness according to Pyrrhonic Scepticism, Epicureanism and Stoicism will be discussed. Three objections to eudaimonism will then be presented. According to the first objection raised by the Kantian John Hare, eudaimonism is a self-centred theory which posits an improper relation of subordination between moral acts and personal happiness. A counter-argument from Christopher Toner will be examined, who argues that eudaimonism is concerned with being in the right relation to the good, not with egoistic self-inflation. According to the second objection raised by Hobbes and David Gauthier, eudaimonism relies on antiquated notions of final causality and objective goodness which are eliminated by modern science, making it too idealistic. A counter-argument from Jean Hampton to Hobbesian nominalism as being inherently irrational will then be examined. Julia Annas’ remarks on these two issues will be examined at the end of each section. According to the third objection raised by Scotus and Christine Swanton, eudaimonism is insufficiently pluralistic and does not take account of the particularity and complexity of moral thinking. A counter-argument from Julia Annas which defends the thesis of the unity of the virtues will be examined. Taking account of the criticisms to Greco-Roman versions of eudaimonism, it will be argued that Ancient eudaimonism is a defensible normative ethical position, though a Medieval Thomist version of eudaimonism will ultimately be defended due to the limitations of Hellenistic ethics.","abstract_html":"An overview of the nature of virtue ethics from Rosalind Hursthouse will be presented, alongside an account from Christine Swanton of the differentia which distinguish eudaimonism from virtue ethics in general. This will be followed by an account of Julia Annas’ analysis of the structural features of Ancient eudaimonist theories of virtue ethics, focusing especially on the relationship between virtue and happiness. Three different accounts of the relationship between virtue and happiness according to Pyrrhonic Scepticism, Epicureanism and Stoicism will be discussed. Three objections to eudaimonism will then be presented. According to the first objection raised by the Kantian John Hare, eudaimonism is a self-centred theory which posits an improper relation of subordination between moral acts and personal happiness. A counter-argument from Christopher Toner will be examined, who argues that eudaimonism is concerned with being in the right relation to the good, not with egoistic self-inflation. According to the second objection raised by Hobbes and David Gauthier, eudaimonism relies on antiquated notions of final causality and objective goodness which are eliminated by modern science, making it too idealistic. A counter-argument from Jean Hampton to Hobbesian nominalism as being inherently irrational will then be examined. Julia Annas’ remarks on these two issues will be examined at the end of each section. According to the third objection raised by Scotus and Christine Swanton, eudaimonism is insufficiently pluralistic and does not take account of the particularity and complexity of moral thinking. A counter-argument from Julia Annas which defends the thesis of the unity of the virtues will be examined. Taking account of the criticisms to Greco-Roman versions of eudaimonism, it will be argued that Ancient eudaimonism is a defensible normative ethical position, though a Medieval Thomist version of eudaimonism will ultimately be defended due to the limitations of Hellenistic ethics.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Whitmore, Thomas"],"institution":"Oxford Brookes University","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020","date_published":"2020","updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:43:23Z","subjects":[],"languages":["en"],"rights":["All rights reserved"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.24384/99j2-2c22","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Whitmore, Thomas"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Whitmore, Thomas"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2020"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Oxford Brookes University"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["thesis"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["All rights reserved"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://doi.org/10.24384/99j2-2c22","https://radar.brookes.ac.uk/radar/file/856327bf-2c7d-4fae-9311-35c6c5717da1/1/Whitmore2020Eudaimonism.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["An overview of the nature of virtue ethics from Rosalind Hursthouse will be presented, alongside an account from Christine Swanton of the differentia which distinguish eudaimonism from virtue ethics in general. This will be followed by an account of Julia Annas’ analysis of the structural features of Ancient eudaimonist theories of virtue ethics, focusing especially on the relationship between virtue and happiness. Three different accounts of the relationship between virtue and happiness according to Pyrrhonic Scepticism, Epicureanism and Stoicism will be discussed. Three objections to eudaimonism will then be presented. According to the first objection raised by the Kantian John Hare, eudaimonism is a self-centred theory which posits an improper relation of subordination between moral acts and personal happiness. A counter-argument from Christopher Toner will be examined, who argues that eudaimonism is concerned with being in the right relation to the good, not with egoistic self-inflation. According to the second objection raised by Hobbes and David Gauthier, eudaimonism relies on antiquated notions of final causality and objective goodness which are eliminated by modern science, making it too idealistic. A counter-argument from Jean Hampton to Hobbesian nominalism as being inherently irrational will then be examined. Julia Annas’ remarks on these two issues will be examined at the end of each section. According to the third objection raised by Scotus and Christine Swanton, eudaimonism is insufficiently pluralistic and does not take account of the particularity and complexity of moral thinking. A counter-argument from Julia Annas which defends the thesis of the unity of the virtues will be examined. Taking account of the criticisms to Greco-Roman versions of eudaimonism, it will be argued that Ancient eudaimonism is a defensible normative ethical position, though a Medieval Thomist version of eudaimonism will ultimately be defended due to the limitations of Hellenistic ethics."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Is Ancient Eudaimonism a Defensible Normative Ethical Position?"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Whitmore, Thomas"],"dc:creator":["Whitmore, Thomas"],"dc:date":["2020"],"dc:description":["An overview of the nature of virtue ethics from Rosalind Hursthouse will be presented, alongside an account from Christine Swanton of the differentia which distinguish eudaimonism from virtue ethics in general. This will be followed by an account of Julia Annas’ analysis of the structural features of Ancient eudaimonist theories of virtue ethics, focusing especially on the relationship between virtue and happiness. Three different accounts of the relationship between virtue and happiness according to Pyrrhonic Scepticism, Epicureanism and Stoicism will be discussed. Three objections to eudaimonism will then be presented. According to the first objection raised by the Kantian John Hare, eudaimonism is a self-centred theory which posits an improper relation of subordination between moral acts and personal happiness. A counter-argument from Christopher Toner will be examined, who argues that eudaimonism is concerned with being in the right relation to the good, not with egoistic self-inflation. According to the second objection raised by Hobbes and David Gauthier, eudaimonism relies on antiquated notions of final causality and objective goodness which are eliminated by modern science, making it too idealistic. A counter-argument from Jean Hampton to Hobbesian nominalism as being inherently irrational will then be examined. Julia Annas’ remarks on these two issues will be examined at the end of each section. According to the third objection raised by Scotus and Christine Swanton, eudaimonism is insufficiently pluralistic and does not take account of the particularity and complexity of moral thinking. A counter-argument from Julia Annas which defends the thesis of the unity of the virtues will be examined. Taking account of the criticisms to Greco-Roman versions of eudaimonism, it will be argued that Ancient eudaimonism is a defensible normative ethical position, though a Medieval Thomist version of eudaimonism will ultimately be defended due to the limitations of Hellenistic ethics."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://doi.org/10.24384/99j2-2c22","https://radar.brookes.ac.uk/radar/file/856327bf-2c7d-4fae-9311-35c6c5717da1/1/Whitmore2020Eudaimonism.pdf"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:publisher":["Oxford Brookes University"],"dc:rights":["All rights reserved"],"dc:title":["Is Ancient Eudaimonism a Defensible Normative Ethical Position?"],"dc:type":["thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:43:23Z"}