Core Conceptual Scheme: A Search for the Common Aspects of Human Thought

This thesis argues for the existence of core concepts as the ‘bedrock’ of human thought. It is argued that – though they emerge from different research methodologies and are expressed through different terminologies – a multi-disciplinary range of studies of concepts suggest the existence of a massive, central core of concepts within human thought. In consequence, it is argued that philosophical enquiries into the nature and structure of concepts must develop a deeper understanding of concepts based on the empirical findings of those working a number of different fields – most particularly developmental and linguistic studies. Building on the findings of these empirical studies, this thesis argues that while the challenge posed by linguistic relativists and externalists is significant, their approach is characterised by key weaknesses – that the former overplay the dependence of thought upon language, and that the latter overplay the influence of the external world on human thought. In short, this is a tendency to mischaracterise surface manifestations caused by the underlying conceptual structure of human thought as structure. In answer to this, it is argued that due to his non-reductive approach to the question of concepts, the works of Peter Strawson are crucially important to any attempted understanding of the nature and structure of human thought. Building out from Strawson’s works, however, this thesis also argues that the current status quo focuses excessively on atomising questions of whether particular concepts are core to human thought. Instead, this thesis argues for a pluralistic approach which seeks to map out the taxonomy and topology of the human conceptual landscape, and suggests that the investigation of categories of concepts would be far more profitable than the currently emerging tendency for various fields to drift apart.

Grantor dc:publisher

Oxford Brookes University

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Vilistere, Dana

Contributors dc:contributor

• Cain, Mark
• Boulter, Stephen

Statement dc:rights

• All rights reserved

Language dc:language

en

DOI dc:identifier

https://doi.org/10.24384/vg0s-dn43

OAI identifier oai:identifier

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