Inherited Ontologies and the Relations between Philosophy of Mind and the Empirical Cognitive Sciences
type: CreativeWork
description: A productive relationship between the philosophy of mind and the empirical cognitive sciences not only is possible, but also is pursued productively by practitioners from both sides. In the first two chapters, I consider two examples of sets of concepts (“folk psychology” and the “architecture of the mind”) which are shared between the philosophy of mind and the empirical cognitive sciences and analyze them from both perspectives. I introduce a historical-analytical apparatus called “inherited ontologies” to track these sets of concepts and how they emerge, mutate, and replicate over time in order to show that what can begin as semantic opacity can end as ontological confusion. I argue that the important question is not whether we inherit our implicit ideas about the mind from our genes or our culture, but how shared inheritance manifests in different ways in different individuals. In the third chapter, I argue that the plurality of kinds of minds should inform how we research our minds. Instead of supposing that a plurality of approaches to study a plurality of minds is a problem to be solved, we should embrace cognitive and methodological diversity as not only possible but desirable in a shared problem space. The cognitive sciences should develop a unity of purpose without collapsing into a presumed uniformity of subject matter.
abstract: A productive relationship between the philosophy of mind and the empirical cognitive sciences not only is possible, but also is pursued productively by practitioners from both sides. In the first two chapters, I consider two examples of sets of concepts (“folk psychology” and the “architecture of the mind”) which are shared between the philosophy of mind and the empirical cognitive sciences and analyze them from both perspectives. I introduce a historical-analytical apparatus called “inherited ontologies” to track these sets of concepts and how they emerge, mutate, and replicate over time in order to show that what can begin as semantic opacity can end as ontological confusion. I argue that the important question is not whether we inherit our implicit ideas about the mind from our genes or our culture, but how shared inheritance manifests in different ways in different individuals. In the third chapter, I argue that the plurality of kinds of minds should inform how we research our minds. Instead of supposing that a plurality of approaches to study a plurality of minds is a problem to be solved, we should embrace cognitive and methodological diversity as not only possible but desirable in a shared problem space. The cognitive sciences should develop a unity of purpose without collapsing into a presumed uniformity of subject matter.
author: Rickels, Christopher A.
language: English
keywords: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Cognitive Psychology, Science History, Neurosciences, Artificial Intelligence, Behavioral Sciences, Education, Linguistics, Metaphysics, Psychology, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, inherited ontology, philosophy of psychology, folk psychology, nativism, empiricism, modularity, speculative psychology, meme, memetics
date published: 2013-08-22
date modified: 2026-07-24T03:37:16Z
provider: OhioLINK
publisher: Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
type: WebPage
source organization: University of Toledo