{"id":{"repo_id":"ohiolink","oai_identifier":"oai:etd.ohiolink.edu:kent1246273422"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/ohiolink/oai:etd.ohiolink.edu:kent1246273422","repository":{"repo_id":"ohiolink","name":"OhioLINK","base_url":"https://etd.ohiolink.edu/acprod/odb_etd/ws/oai/oai"},"display":{"title":"Prospective Reappointment and the Monetary Policy Preferences of the Federal Open Market Committee Members","abstract":"The main purpose of the research is to investigate the behavioral of the Governors and Bank Presidents at the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). We have a hypothesis that the Bank presidents and Governors behave differently. We suppose that the governors of the FOMC which are completing a term of another governor and are eligible for reappointment change their behavior as there is a short amount of time prior the reappointment. This correlation has a big effect on the decision making at all meetings as very few of the governors serve for their full term; as a full term is 14 years, there is a high turnover among the governors at FOMC. Therefore, the time left to the reappointment of each governor may be causing a bigger impact on the decision making than the monetary policy.This research is contributing to the political economy literature in the area of Federal Reserve Bank of the United States of America. We have a unique data set as we do not use a dissent voting data. Even though dissent data sets are available for a much longer periods of time, they lose much of the relevant information. The motivation for our research is the fact that all of the governors of the Federal Open Market committee are appointed by the President of the U. S. and in this way he can reach the policies in which he is interested.","abstract_html":"The main purpose of the research is to investigate the behavioral of the Governors and Bank Presidents at the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). We have a hypothesis that the Bank presidents and Governors behave differently. We suppose that the governors of the FOMC which are completing a term of another governor and are eligible for reappointment change their behavior as there is a short amount of time prior the reappointment. This correlation has a big effect on the decision making at all meetings as very few of the governors serve for their full term; as a full term is 14 years, there is a high turnover among the governors at FOMC. Therefore, the time left to the reappointment of each governor may be causing a bigger impact on the decision making than the monetary policy.This research is contributing to the political economy literature in the area of Federal Reserve Bank of the United States of America. We have a unique data set as we do not use a dissent voting data. Even though dissent data sets are available for a much longer periods of time, they lose much of the relevant information. The motivation for our research is the fact that all of the governors of the Federal Open Market committee are appointed by the President of the U. S. and in this way he can reach the policies in which he is interested.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kotenko, Diana G."],"institution":"Kent State University","degree_name":"MA","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"College of Business and Entrepreneurship, Ambassador Crawford / Department of Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Ellis, Michael"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2009,"date_issued":"2009","date_published":"2009","updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:35:52Z","subjects":["Economics","Federal Reserve Bank","Federal Reserve System","Board of Governors","Federal Reserve Bank Presidents","Federal Funds Rate","Taylor Rule","Great Moderation","Power of Appointment","President","Political Economy"],"languages":["English"],"rights":["unrestricted","This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1246273422","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Ellis, Michael"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kotenko, Diana G."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2009"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Kent State University / OhioLINK"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Electronic Thesis or Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["College of Business and Entrepreneurship, Ambassador Crawford / Department of Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["MA"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Kent State University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Economics","Federal Reserve Bank","Federal Reserve System","Board of Governors","Federal Reserve Bank Presidents","Federal Funds Rate","Taylor Rule","Great Moderation","Power of Appointment","President","Political Economy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["unrestricted","This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1246273422"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The main purpose of the research is to investigate the behavioral of the Governors and Bank Presidents at the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). We have a hypothesis that the Bank presidents and Governors behave differently. We suppose that the governors of the FOMC which are completing a term of another governor and are eligible for reappointment change their behavior as there is a short amount of time prior the reappointment. This correlation has a big effect on the decision making at all meetings as very few of the governors serve for their full term; as a full term is 14 years, there is a high turnover among the governors at FOMC. Therefore, the time left to the reappointment of each governor may be causing a bigger impact on the decision making than the monetary policy.This research is contributing to the political economy literature in the area of Federal Reserve Bank of the United States of America. We have a unique data set as we do not use a dissent voting data. Even though dissent data sets are available for a much longer periods of time, they lose much of the relevant information. The motivation for our research is the fact that all of the governors of the Federal Open Market committee are appointed by the President of the U. S. and in this way he can reach the policies in which he is interested."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf","p.94","537.9 KB"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Prospective Reappointment and the Monetary Policy Preferences of the Federal Open Market Committee Members"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Ellis, Michael"],"dc:creator":["Kotenko, Diana G."],"dc:date":["2009"],"dc:description":["The main purpose of the research is to investigate the behavioral of the Governors and Bank Presidents at the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). We have a hypothesis that the Bank presidents and Governors behave differently. We suppose that the governors of the FOMC which are completing a term of another governor and are eligible for reappointment change their behavior as there is a short amount of time prior the reappointment. This correlation has a big effect on the decision making at all meetings as very few of the governors serve for their full term; as a full term is 14 years, there is a high turnover among the governors at FOMC. Therefore, the time left to the reappointment of each governor may be causing a bigger impact on the decision making than the monetary policy.This research is contributing to the political economy literature in the area of Federal Reserve Bank of the United States of America. We have a unique data set as we do not use a dissent voting data. Even though dissent data sets are available for a much longer periods of time, they lose much of the relevant information. The motivation for our research is the fact that all of the governors of the Federal Open Market committee are appointed by the President of the U. S. and in this way he can reach the policies in which he is interested."],"dc:format":["application/pdf","p.94","537.9 KB"],"dc:identifier":["http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1246273422"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:publisher":["Kent State University / OhioLINK"],"dc:rights":["unrestricted","This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws."],"dc:subject":["Economics","Federal Reserve Bank","Federal Reserve System","Board of Governors","Federal Reserve Bank Presidents","Federal Funds Rate","Taylor Rule","Great Moderation","Power of Appointment","President","Political Economy"],"dc:title":["Prospective Reappointment and the Monetary Policy Preferences of the Federal Open Market Committee Members"],"dc:type":["Electronic Thesis or Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["College of Business and Entrepreneurship, Ambassador Crawford / Department of Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["MA"],"thesis:institution_name":["Kent State University"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:35:52Z"}