EXPLORING DREAMING CONSCIOUSNESS FROM AN ENACTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

This thesis discusses an enactivist interpretation of dreaming consciousness and compares it with the behaviorist and functionalist interpretations of dreams. The major argument is: enactivism can answer the challenge from dreams and propose a more advantageous account of dreaming experiences than behaviorism and functionalism. In particular, the enactivist account of dreams proposed in this thesis can explain two special characteristics of dreaming experiences that distinguish them from waking experiences: 1) the absurdity in dream content and 2) the partial lack of self-awareness during dreaming states. This enactivist account of dreaming experiences is also proposed as a helpful philosophical account to inspire corresponding improvements in the method of collection, as well as the interpretation of dream reports in empirical studies on dreams.

Author dc:creator

• WU QIANTONG

• Dream Reports
• Behaviorism
• Functionalism
• Mental Content
• Dreaming Experiences
• Enactivism

Licence

• https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/bitstreams/f6da5b9d-5c67-4a10-82f0-4a9e46ac1b10/download