{"id":{"repo_id":"nus","oai_identifier":"oai:scholarbank.nus.edu.sg:10635/30748"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/nus/oai:scholarbank.nus.edu.sg:10635/30748","repository":{"repo_id":"nus","name":"National University of Singapore","base_url":"https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Reasons, Agency, and Responsibility: A Defence of Soft Compatibilism","abstract":"I defend a thesis of soft compatibilism. First, I argue that libertarian free will is incompatible with causal determinism and indeterminism because the human will is subject to antecedent conditions. If causal determinism is true, then these antecedent conditions are sufficient for the will to be a certain way. If indeterminism is true, then these antecedent conditions are insufficient for the will to be a certain way. Either way, I argue, certain psychological states with reasons as content figure in the determination or influencing of agents' choices and actions. Second, I argue that a will conditioned by antecedent facts or events is compatible with retrospective moral responsibility, provided that retrospective moral responsibility does not require the ultimacy condition. I argue that it does not. Both determinism and indeterminism allow agents to be retrospectively responsible for their choices and actions because the relevant psychological states with reasons as content figure in the determination or influencing of the agent. Therefore, retrospective moral responsibility is compatible with the will being subject to antecedent conditions, whether or not causal determinism or indeterminism is true.","abstract_html":"I defend a thesis of soft compatibilism. First, I argue that libertarian free will is incompatible with causal determinism and indeterminism because the human will is subject to antecedent conditions. If causal determinism is true, then these antecedent conditions are sufficient for the will to be a certain way. If indeterminism is true, then these antecedent conditions are insufficient for the will to be a certain way. Either way, I argue, certain psychological states with reasons as content figure in the determination or influencing of agents' choices and actions. Second, I argue that a will conditioned by antecedent facts or events is compatible with retrospective moral responsibility, provided that retrospective moral responsibility does not require the ultimacy condition. I argue that it does not. Both determinism and indeterminism allow agents to be retrospectively responsible for their choices and actions because the relevant psychological states with reasons as content figure in the determination or influencing of the agent. Therefore, retrospective moral responsibility is compatible with the will being subject to antecedent conditions, whether or not causal determinism or indeterminism is true.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["WONG SOO LAM"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-10-05","date_published":"2011-10-05","updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:32:30Z","subjects":["Agent, Causation, Compatibilism, Freewill, Reasons, Responsibility"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["WONG SOO LAM"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2011-10-05"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/30748"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Agent, Causation, Compatibilism, Freewill, Reasons, Responsibility"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/bitstreams/9df6cebe-936d-4382-9788-c4a826e3a2b0/download"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["I defend a thesis of soft compatibilism. First, I argue that libertarian free will is incompatible with causal determinism and indeterminism because the human will is subject to antecedent conditions. If causal determinism is true, then these antecedent conditions are sufficient for the will to be a certain way. If indeterminism is true, then these antecedent conditions are insufficient for the will to be a certain way. Either way, I argue, certain psychological states with reasons as content figure in the determination or influencing of agents' choices and actions. Second, I argue that a will conditioned by antecedent facts or events is compatible with retrospective moral responsibility, provided that retrospective moral responsibility does not require the ultimacy condition. I argue that it does not. Both determinism and indeterminism allow agents to be retrospectively responsible for their choices and actions because the relevant psychological states with reasons as content figure in the determination or influencing of the agent. Therefore, retrospective moral responsibility is compatible with the will being subject to antecedent conditions, whether or not causal determinism or indeterminism is true."]},{"key":"dc:format.checksum.md5","label":"Dc Format Checksum Md5","values":["280cec3b6c92da0a5893dba50c2ec8bf","f8869e24d4957ee40389d2316a70cd89"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Reasons, Agency, and Responsibility: A Defence of Soft Compatibilism"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["WONG SOO LAM"],"dc:date.issued":["2011-10-05"],"dc:description.abstract":["I defend a thesis of soft compatibilism. First, I argue that libertarian free will is incompatible with causal determinism and indeterminism because the human will is subject to antecedent conditions. If causal determinism is true, then these antecedent conditions are sufficient for the will to be a certain way. If indeterminism is true, then these antecedent conditions are insufficient for the will to be a certain way. Either way, I argue, certain psychological states with reasons as content figure in the determination or influencing of agents' choices and actions. Second, I argue that a will conditioned by antecedent facts or events is compatible with retrospective moral responsibility, provided that retrospective moral responsibility does not require the ultimacy condition. I argue that it does not. Both determinism and indeterminism allow agents to be retrospectively responsible for their choices and actions because the relevant psychological states with reasons as content figure in the determination or influencing of the agent. Therefore, retrospective moral responsibility is compatible with the will being subject to antecedent conditions, whether or not causal determinism or indeterminism is true."],"dc:format.checksum.md5":["280cec3b6c92da0a5893dba50c2ec8bf","f8869e24d4957ee40389d2316a70cd89"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/bitstreams/9df6cebe-936d-4382-9788-c4a826e3a2b0/download"],"dc:relation.isreferencedby":["https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/30748"],"dc:subject":["Agent, Causation, Compatibilism, Freewill, Reasons, Responsibility"],"dc:title":["Reasons, Agency, and Responsibility: A Defence of Soft Compatibilism"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:32:30Z"}