The Irreducibility of Intentionality

We often explain our actions in terms of our beliefs and desires. These beliefs and desires are often referred to as intentional mental states, i.e. mental states with contents that refer to something outside of themselves. There are two pertinent questions in the philosophy of mind regarding the nature of these intentional states and the kind of explanation that is involved when we appeal to them. The debates have been ongoing ona) Whether these intentional states are real and whether they truly explain anything;b) Whether these intentional states can be reduced to physical causes one way or another.In this thesis, I answer yes to (a) and no to (b). I will present original arguments defending the indispensability of intentional states in purposive explanations and their irreducibility to natural causes.

Author dc:creator

• TAN PEI-EN

• intentionality, mind, dualism, reasons, causes, physicalism