{"id":{"repo_id":"nus","oai_identifier":"oai:scholarbank.nus.edu.sg:10635/13668"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/nus/oai:scholarbank.nus.edu.sg:10635/13668","repository":{"repo_id":"nus","name":"National University of Singapore","base_url":"https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The inconsistent cartesian dreaming argument","abstract":"A premise of the Cartesian Dreaming Argument is the claim that dreams are phenomenologically indistinguishable from waking experiences. My thesis focuses on how the skeptic arrives at this claim, and I argue that the claim is inconsistent with the premises used to derive it. This inconsistency runs as follows: if the claim were true then it cannot be known that dreams have occurred. I then consider several attempted solutions to this inconsistency problem, and conclude that they are all unsuccessful. Lastly, I offer an interpretation of the argument a?? as a reductio ad absurdum argument a?? that makes sense of this inconsistency.","abstract_html":"A premise of the Cartesian Dreaming Argument is the claim that dreams are phenomenologically indistinguishable from waking experiences. My thesis focuses on how the skeptic arrives at this claim, and I argue that the claim is inconsistent with the premises used to derive it. This inconsistency runs as follows: if the claim were true then it cannot be known that dreams have occurred. I then consider several attempted solutions to this inconsistency problem, and conclude that they are all unsuccessful. Lastly, I offer an interpretation of the argument a?? as a reductio ad absurdum argument a?? that makes sense of this inconsistency.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["LIM ENG LEONG"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2004,"date_issued":"2004-01-11","date_published":"2004-01-11","updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:32:04Z","subjects":["cartesian dreaming inconsistency descartes skeptic skepticism"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["LIM ENG LEONG"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2004-01-11"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/13668"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["cartesian dreaming inconsistency descartes skeptic skepticism"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/bitstreams/fcc950b4-4e4b-45cd-bbdc-4ab1895187c6/download"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["A premise of the Cartesian Dreaming Argument is the claim that dreams are phenomenologically indistinguishable from waking experiences. My thesis focuses on how the skeptic arrives at this claim, and I argue that the claim is inconsistent with the premises used to derive it. This inconsistency runs as follows: if the claim were true then it cannot be known that dreams have occurred. I then consider several attempted solutions to this inconsistency problem, and conclude that they are all unsuccessful. Lastly, I offer an interpretation of the argument a?? as a reductio ad absurdum argument a?? that makes sense of this inconsistency."]},{"key":"dc:format.checksum.md5","label":"Dc Format Checksum Md5","values":["383b68ebb797f57f98302c752effa908","6675977479a1425722cd3e314d634606"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The inconsistent cartesian dreaming argument"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["LIM ENG LEONG"],"dc:date.issued":["2004-01-11"],"dc:description.abstract":["A premise of the Cartesian Dreaming Argument is the claim that dreams are phenomenologically indistinguishable from waking experiences. My thesis focuses on how the skeptic arrives at this claim, and I argue that the claim is inconsistent with the premises used to derive it. This inconsistency runs as follows: if the claim were true then it cannot be known that dreams have occurred. I then consider several attempted solutions to this inconsistency problem, and conclude that they are all unsuccessful. Lastly, I offer an interpretation of the argument a?? as a reductio ad absurdum argument a?? that makes sense of this inconsistency."],"dc:format.checksum.md5":["383b68ebb797f57f98302c752effa908","6675977479a1425722cd3e314d634606"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/bitstreams/fcc950b4-4e4b-45cd-bbdc-4ab1895187c6/download"],"dc:relation.isreferencedby":["https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/13668"],"dc:subject":["cartesian dreaming inconsistency descartes skeptic skepticism"],"dc:title":["The inconsistent cartesian dreaming argument"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:32:04Z"}