{"id":{"repo_id":"nps","oai_identifier":"oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/74800"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/nps/oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/74800","repository":{"repo_id":"nps","name":"Naval Postgraduate School","base_url":"https://calhoun.nps.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"THE GRAY ZONE SURGE: RUSSIA’S MARITIME SUBVERSION IN THE BALTIC SEA","abstract":"This thesis examines the extent and nature of Russia's gray zone tactics in the maritime domain within the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). States utilize gray zone tactics when they act through kinetic and non-kinetic means that allow them to stay below the threshold of conventional war. To support economic interests to fund its war in Ukraine, Russia has expanded maritime gray zone activities since 2022. Its reliance on gray zone tactics in the maritime domain reflects the limits of its conventional naval capability and fleet modernization. Activities attributed to Russia’s shadow fleet include damage to undersea critical infrastructure, Automatic Identification System (AIS) spoofing, Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming, and sanction avoidance. While the scope and frequency of gray zone tactics attributed to Russia have increased in recent years, these approaches still only fulfill limited strategic objectives. Implications highlight the need for a comprehensive, proportionate North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response that prioritizes vigilance, member state resilience, and rapid mobilization. Future agility will require anticipating the changing role of irregular statecraft across multiple domains.","abstract_html":"This thesis examines the extent and nature of Russia's gray zone tactics in the maritime domain within the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). States utilize gray zone tactics when they act through kinetic and non-kinetic means that allow them to stay below the threshold of conventional war. To support economic interests to fund its war in Ukraine, Russia has expanded maritime gray zone activities since 2022. Its reliance on gray zone tactics in the maritime domain reflects the limits of its conventional naval capability and fleet modernization. Activities attributed to Russia’s shadow fleet include damage to undersea critical infrastructure, Automatic Identification System (AIS) spoofing, Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming, and sanction avoidance. While the scope and frequency of gray zone tactics attributed to Russia have increased in recent years, these approaches still only fulfill limited strategic objectives. Implications highlight the need for a comprehensive, proportionate North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response that prioritizes vigilance, member state resilience, and rapid mobilization. Future agility will require anticipating the changing role of irregular statecraft across multiple domains.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Durigan, Joseph P."],"institution":"Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Matovski, Aleksandar"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025-12","date_published":"2025-12","updated_at":"2026-07-27T20:24:57Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":["This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10945/74800","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Matovski, Aleksandar"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Durigan, Joseph P."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2026-03-17T16:16:40Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2026-03-17T16:16:40Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2025-12"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/10945/74800"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis examines the extent and nature of Russia's gray zone tactics in the maritime domain within the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). States utilize gray zone tactics when they act through kinetic and non-kinetic means that allow them to stay below the threshold of conventional war. To support economic interests to fund its war in Ukraine, Russia has expanded maritime gray zone activities since 2022. Its reliance on gray zone tactics in the maritime domain reflects the limits of its conventional naval capability and fleet modernization. Activities attributed to Russia’s shadow fleet include damage to undersea critical infrastructure, Automatic Identification System (AIS) spoofing, Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming, and sanction avoidance. While the scope and frequency of gray zone tactics attributed to Russia have increased in recent years, these approaches still only fulfill limited strategic objectives. Implications highlight the need for a comprehensive, proportionate North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response that prioritizes vigilance, member state resilience, and rapid mobilization. Future agility will require anticipating the changing role of irregular statecraft across multiple domains."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["THE GRAY ZONE SURGE: RUSSIA’S MARITIME SUBVERSION IN THE BALTIC SEA"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Matovski, Aleksandar"],"dc:creator":["Durigan, Joseph P."],"dc:date.accessioned":["2026-03-17T16:16:40Z"],"dc:date.available":["2026-03-17T16:16:40Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2025-12"],"dc:description.abstract":["This thesis examines the extent and nature of Russia's gray zone tactics in the maritime domain within the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). States utilize gray zone tactics when they act through kinetic and non-kinetic means that allow them to stay below the threshold of conventional war. To support economic interests to fund its war in Ukraine, Russia has expanded maritime gray zone activities since 2022. Its reliance on gray zone tactics in the maritime domain reflects the limits of its conventional naval capability and fleet modernization. Activities attributed to Russia’s shadow fleet include damage to undersea critical infrastructure, Automatic Identification System (AIS) spoofing, Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming, and sanction avoidance. While the scope and frequency of gray zone tactics attributed to Russia have increased in recent years, these approaches still only fulfill limited strategic objectives. Implications highlight the need for a comprehensive, proportionate North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response that prioritizes vigilance, member state resilience, and rapid mobilization. Future agility will require anticipating the changing role of irregular statecraft across multiple domains."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/10945/74800"],"dc:publisher":["Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School"],"dc:rights":["This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States."],"dc:title":["THE GRAY ZONE SURGE: RUSSIA’S MARITIME SUBVERSION IN THE BALTIC SEA"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T20:24:57Z"}