ENHANCING CYBERSECURITY RESILIENCE: EVALUATING SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS AS THE 17TH CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR

This thesis examines the role of space-based systems within the broader context of U.S. critical infrastructure (CI) and assesses whether these systems warrant designation as a distinct CI sector. Space systems have increasingly become interconnected across multiple existing CI sectors, including telecommunications, energy, and finance, which introduce unique vulnerabilities. Current CI protection frameworks fall short in addressing the specific threats facing space assets—such as kinetic ASAT threats, cyber intrusions, and supply chain weaknesses. Through a review of federal policies, frameworks, and recent literature, along with case studies on significant CI cyber incidents, this research identifies critical gaps in existing resilience and risk management strategies for space infrastructure. While the designation of a dedicated CI sector for space would provide tailored oversight and enforce standardized security measures, this study argues that existing federal initiatives and collaborative frameworks, if fully implemented, may offer sufficient security controls to manage the increasing risks without imposing additional regulatory burdens.

Department dc:contributor.department

Information Sciences (IS)

Grantor dc:publisher

Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School

Year dc:date.issued

2024

Author dc:creator

• Campbell, Nicholas A.

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Shives, Timothy R.

Statement dc:rights

• This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/10945/73430

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/73430