{"id":{"repo_id":"nps","oai_identifier":"oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/72380"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/nps/oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/72380","repository":{"repo_id":"nps","name":"Naval Postgraduate School","base_url":"https://calhoun.nps.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE MARINE CORPS TACTICAL CLOUD","abstract":"A critical knowledge gap exists in the Department of Defense (DOD) zero trust architecture (ZTA) implementation strategy. The majority of published academic research and technical documentation focuses on maturing zero trust (ZT) capabilities for enterprise networks without any detailed analysis on identifying risks that commanders and troops at the tactical edge will face. Laminating enterprise ZTA solutions to the tactical edge without first adapting technologies, system models, and policies to operate in a denied, degraded, intermittent, or latent (DDIL) networking environment could lead to severe mission consequences. This thesis proposes a tactical ZTA (TZTA) framework that expands on existing DOD ZTA reference architecture. Additional components and features are defined to meet the dynamic network conditions at the tactical edge. These components integrate legacy devices into a TZTA and identify suitable interfaces for federation between ZTAs. Supplementary features of these components enable identity and application federation, device attestation, weapon systems employment, and comprehensive IDS coverage within the architecture. Future implementation and testing of the proposed framework will lead to identification of suitable technologies and models using quantitative analysis to form the technical basis for future acquisition strategies that guide the DOD's transition to ZTA in both enterprise and tactical environments.","abstract_html":"A critical knowledge gap exists in the Department of Defense (DOD) zero trust architecture (ZTA) implementation strategy. The majority of published academic research and technical documentation focuses on maturing zero trust (ZT) capabilities for enterprise networks without any detailed analysis on identifying risks that commanders and troops at the tactical edge will face. Laminating enterprise ZTA solutions to the tactical edge without first adapting technologies, system models, and policies to operate in a denied, degraded, intermittent, or latent (DDIL) networking environment could lead to severe mission consequences. This thesis proposes a tactical ZTA (TZTA) framework that expands on existing DOD ZTA reference architecture. Additional components and features are defined to meet the dynamic network conditions at the tactical edge. These components integrate legacy devices into a TZTA and identify suitable interfaces for federation between ZTAs. Supplementary features of these components enable identity and application federation, device attestation, weapon systems employment, and comprehensive IDS coverage within the architecture. Future implementation and testing of the proposed framework will lead to identification of suitable technologies and models using quantitative analysis to form the technical basis for future acquisition strategies that guide the DOD's transition to ZTA in both enterprise and tactical environments.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Oshiro, Dane M."],"institution":"Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Computer Science (CS)","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Shaffer, Alan B.","Singh, Gurminder"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2023,"date_issued":"2023-09","date_published":"2023-09","updated_at":"2026-07-27T20:24:46Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":["This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10945/72380","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Shaffer, Alan B.","Singh, Gurminder"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Computer Science (CS)"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Oshiro, Dane M."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2023-10-31T17:15:21Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2023-10-31T17:15:21Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2023-09"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. 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This thesis proposes a tactical ZTA (TZTA) framework that expands on existing DOD ZTA reference architecture. Additional components and features are defined to meet the dynamic network conditions at the tactical edge. These components integrate legacy devices into a TZTA and identify suitable interfaces for federation between ZTAs. Supplementary features of these components enable identity and application federation, device attestation, weapon systems employment, and comprehensive IDS coverage within the architecture. Future implementation and testing of the proposed framework will lead to identification of suitable technologies and models using quantitative analysis to form the technical basis for future acquisition strategies that guide the DOD's transition to ZTA in both enterprise and tactical environments."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE MARINE CORPS TACTICAL CLOUD"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Shaffer, Alan B.","Singh, Gurminder"],"dc:contributor.department":["Computer Science (CS)"],"dc:creator":["Oshiro, Dane M."],"dc:date.accessioned":["2023-10-31T17:15:21Z"],"dc:date.available":["2023-10-31T17:15:21Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2023-09"],"dc:description.abstract":["A critical knowledge gap exists in the Department of Defense (DOD) zero trust architecture (ZTA) implementation strategy. The majority of published academic research and technical documentation focuses on maturing zero trust (ZT) capabilities for enterprise networks without any detailed analysis on identifying risks that commanders and troops at the tactical edge will face. Laminating enterprise ZTA solutions to the tactical edge without first adapting technologies, system models, and policies to operate in a denied, degraded, intermittent, or latent (DDIL) networking environment could lead to severe mission consequences. This thesis proposes a tactical ZTA (TZTA) framework that expands on existing DOD ZTA reference architecture. Additional components and features are defined to meet the dynamic network conditions at the tactical edge. These components integrate legacy devices into a TZTA and identify suitable interfaces for federation between ZTAs. Supplementary features of these components enable identity and application federation, device attestation, weapon systems employment, and comprehensive IDS coverage within the architecture. Future implementation and testing of the proposed framework will lead to identification of suitable technologies and models using quantitative analysis to form the technical basis for future acquisition strategies that guide the DOD's transition to ZTA in both enterprise and tactical environments."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/10945/72380"],"dc:publisher":["Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School"],"dc:rights":["This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States."],"dc:title":["ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE MARINE CORPS TACTICAL CLOUD"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T20:24:46Z"}