{"id":{"repo_id":"nps","oai_identifier":"oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/63469"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/nps/oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/63469","repository":{"repo_id":"nps","name":"Naval Postgraduate School","base_url":"https://calhoun.nps.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"ESCALATE TO DE-ESCALATE: SPECULATION ON RUSSIAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY","abstract":"This thesis contributes to the debate regarding the Department of Defense's assessment that the Russian Federation possesses an \"escalate to de-escalate\" strategy. This research approaches the question through analysis of official doctrine, statements, nuclear capabilities and military exercises of the Russian Federation following the Cold War. The Russian Federation develops weapons for the employment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and exercises the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons during major exercises. Its official military doctrine is conducive to an \"escalate to de-escalate\" strategy. This research concludes that the Russian Federation assigns both an \"escalate to de-escalate\" and operational role for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The Department of Defense is correct in its assessment of Russian nuclear strategy and should pursue initiatives that avoid legitimizing the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, contribute to strategic miscalculations, or set the conditions for a security dilemma between the United States and the Russian Federation.","abstract_html":"This thesis contributes to the debate regarding the Department of Defense's assessment that the Russian Federation possesses an "escalate to de-escalate" strategy. This research approaches the question through analysis of official doctrine, statements, nuclear capabilities and military exercises of the Russian Federation following the Cold War. The Russian Federation develops weapons for the employment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and exercises the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons during major exercises. Its official military doctrine is conducive to an "escalate to de-escalate" strategy. This research concludes that the Russian Federation assigns both an "escalate to de-escalate" and operational role for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The Department of Defense is correct in its assessment of Russian nuclear strategy and should pursue initiatives that avoid legitimizing the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, contribute to strategic miscalculations, or set the conditions for a security dilemma between the United States and the Russian Federation.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kirbyson, Frank R. III"],"institution":"Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"National Security Affairs (NSA)","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Tsypkin, Mikhail"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-09","date_published":"2019-09","updated_at":"2026-07-27T20:25:08Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":["This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10945/63469","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Tsypkin, Mikhail"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["National Security Affairs (NSA)"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kirbyson, Frank R. 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This research concludes that the Russian Federation assigns both an \"escalate to de-escalate\" and operational role for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The Department of Defense is correct in its assessment of Russian nuclear strategy and should pursue initiatives that avoid legitimizing the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, contribute to strategic miscalculations, or set the conditions for a security dilemma between the United States and the Russian Federation."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["ESCALATE TO DE-ESCALATE: SPECULATION ON RUSSIAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Tsypkin, Mikhail"],"dc:contributor.department":["National Security Affairs (NSA)"],"dc:creator":["Kirbyson, Frank R. III"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2019-11-04T18:19:55Z"],"dc:date.available":["2019-11-04T18:19:55Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2019-09"],"dc:description.abstract":["This thesis contributes to the debate regarding the Department of Defense's assessment that the Russian Federation possesses an \"escalate to de-escalate\" strategy. This research approaches the question through analysis of official doctrine, statements, nuclear capabilities and military exercises of the Russian Federation following the Cold War. The Russian Federation develops weapons for the employment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and exercises the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons during major exercises. Its official military doctrine is conducive to an \"escalate to de-escalate\" strategy. This research concludes that the Russian Federation assigns both an \"escalate to de-escalate\" and operational role for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The Department of Defense is correct in its assessment of Russian nuclear strategy and should pursue initiatives that avoid legitimizing the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, contribute to strategic miscalculations, or set the conditions for a security dilemma between the United States and the Russian Federation."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/10945/63469"],"dc:publisher":["Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School"],"dc:rights":["This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States."],"dc:title":["ESCALATE TO DE-ESCALATE: SPECULATION ON RUSSIAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T20:25:08Z"}