{"id":{"repo_id":"must-thes","oai_identifier":"oai:scholarsmine.mst.edu:doctoral_dissertations-4231"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/must-thes/oai:scholarsmine.mst.edu:doctoral_dissertations-4231","repository":{"repo_id":"must-thes","name":"Missouri University of Science and Technology","base_url":"https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Persistent Stealthy Attacks and their Detection in Large Distributed Cyber-Physical Systems","abstract":"<p>\"Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are increasingly targeted by attackers using a wide and evolving array of methods. When these systems are distributed, every node represents a potential vulnerability, and secure system design must take this into account. Distributed CPSs also have the potential to better detect and handle attacks, by leveraging redundancies of physical measurements between adjacent nodes. The main purpose of this research is to determine the conditions that render a distributed CPS more resistant to attacks, and the conditions that render it more vulnerable. The work is centered around two separate applications: The Smart Grid and Autonomous Drone Swarms. In the first application power theft in the Smart Grid is studied and the difficulty of identifying small persistent attacks between semi-trusted nodes is established. A general approach to handling persistent economic attacks is proposed and analyzed. The second application intrusion of non-compliant drones into a system of flocking drones is considered. An approach to detecting intrusions is proposed and tested in simulations. In both applications the residual sum metric is proposed as a basis for detection\"--Abstract, p. iii</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;&quot;Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are increasingly targeted by attackers using a wide and evolving array of methods. When these systems are distributed, every node represents a potential vulnerability, and secure system design must take this into account. Distributed CPSs also have the potential to better detect and handle attacks, by leveraging redundancies of physical measurements between adjacent nodes. The main purpose of this research is to determine the conditions that render a distributed CPS more resistant to attacks, and the conditions that render it more vulnerable. The work is centered around two separate applications: The Smart Grid and Autonomous Drone Swarms. In the first application power theft in the Smart Grid is studied and the difficulty of identifying small persistent attacks between semi-trusted nodes is established. A general approach to handling persistent economic attacks is proposed and analyzed. The second application intrusion of non-compliant drones into a system of flocking drones is considered. An approach to detecting intrusions is proposed and tested in simulations. In both applications the residual sum metric is proposed as a basis for detection&quot;--Abstract, p. iii&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Thougaard, Simon Bech"],"institution":"Missouri University of Science and Technology","degree_name":"Ph. 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Distributed CPSs also have the potential to better detect and handle attacks, by leveraging redundancies of physical measurements between adjacent nodes. The main purpose of this research is to determine the conditions that render a distributed CPS more resistant to attacks, and the conditions that render it more vulnerable. The work is centered around two separate applications: The Smart Grid and Autonomous Drone Swarms. In the first application power theft in the Smart Grid is studied and the difficulty of identifying small persistent attacks between semi-trusted nodes is established. A general approach to handling persistent economic attacks is proposed and analyzed. The second application intrusion of non-compliant drones into a system of flocking drones is considered. An approach to detecting intrusions is proposed and tested in simulations. In both applications the residual sum metric is proposed as a basis for detection\"--Abstract, p. iii</p>"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Persistent Stealthy Attacks and their Detection in Large Distributed Cyber-Physical Systems"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Thougaard, Simon Bech"],"dc:description.abstract":["<p>\"Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are increasingly targeted by attackers using a wide and evolving array of methods. When these systems are distributed, every node represents a potential vulnerability, and secure system design must take this into account. Distributed CPSs also have the potential to better detect and handle attacks, by leveraging redundancies of physical measurements between adjacent nodes. The main purpose of this research is to determine the conditions that render a distributed CPS more resistant to attacks, and the conditions that render it more vulnerable. The work is centered around two separate applications: The Smart Grid and Autonomous Drone Swarms. In the first application power theft in the Smart Grid is studied and the difficulty of identifying small persistent attacks between semi-trusted nodes is established. A general approach to handling persistent economic attacks is proposed and analyzed. The second application intrusion of non-compliant drones into a system of flocking drones is considered. An approach to detecting intrusions is proposed and tested in simulations. In both applications the residual sum metric is proposed as a basis for detection\"--Abstract, p. iii</p>"],"dc:identifier":["https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/doctoral_dissertations/3226"],"dc:subject":["Cyber-Physical Systems","Drones","Flocking","Security","Smart Grid","Computer Sciences","Physical Sciences and Mathematics"],"dc:title":["Persistent Stealthy Attacks and their Detection in Large Distributed Cyber-Physical Systems"],"dc:type":["Dissertation - Open Access"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph. D. in Computer Science"],"thesis:institution_name":["Missouri University of Science and Technology"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:18:18Z"}