Society and Superior Individuals: On the Social Concerns in Nietzschean Virtue Ethics

Friedrich Nietzsche presents clear attacks on deontological and utilitarian branches of ethical theory. His thoughts on virtue ethics, however, are less clear. Some ethicists argue that Nietzsche’s ethical project is essentially virtue ethical, while others argue that Nietzsche fails to put forth an acceptable ethics. Sympathetic virtue ethicists typically focus on Nietzsche’s virtues of individual character, whereas critics often highlight potential problems between the Nietzschean virtuous agent and his or her society. This thesis seeks to respond to the concerns of the latter group, in order to help make room for reading Nietzsche’s ethical discussions in a more positive light. I pursue this line of thought by way of detailed responses to two prominent critics of Nietzsche’s ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre and Philippa Foot. Chapter one responds to MacIntyre’s claim that Nietzsche’s ethical project is a creation of values ex nihilo, without respect to tradition or community, and is therefore relativistic. I argue that this is not the case, and show that Nietzsche’s ethics is perhaps more capable of responding to the problems MacIntyre sees in modernity than MacIntyre allows. In chapter two I respond to Foot’s claim that Nietzsche’s ethics fails because it cannot categorically proscribe even the most egregious acts. In my view, even though Nietzsche rejects the notion of categorical proscriptions, he has a response to Foot’s concern.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master of Arts (MA)

Grantor dc:publisher

University of Montana

Year

2011

Author dc:creator

• Soderlund, Andrew Theodore

• ethics
• Nietzsche
• philosophy

Repository record dc:identifier

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/896

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:scholarworks.umt.edu:etd-1915