{"id":{"repo_id":"mo-state","oai_identifier":"oai:bearworks.missouristate.edu:theses-2485"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mo-state/oai:bearworks.missouristate.edu:theses-2485","repository":{"repo_id":"mo-state","name":"Missouri State University","base_url":"https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"The Operational Code of the Islamic Repulic of Iran and a Tailored Approach","abstract":"It is imperative U.S. policy-makers and their international partners dissuade Tehran from producing a nuclear weapon, and in the event policy-makers cannot, to deter Tehran from ever launching a nuclear weapon. Operational code analysis seeks to understand how a government makes decisions; greater understanding leads to a more effective deterrent strategy. Alexander George, a follower of Nathan Leites, further defined the operational code framework by asking ten questions, the answers to which define a government's operational code. This thesis asks and answers George's ten questions in relation to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tehran's operational code is then applied to the issue of dissuading and deterring Iran in keeping with the tenets of tailored deterrence theory. Iran's operational code reveals strategic uses for nuclear weapons, as well as three targets of value the U.S. can hold at risk in order to deter Iran: disintegration of the \"Axis of Resistance;” isolation from China and/or Russia; and the stimulation of internal public opposition. Realizing the extent to with Tehran values those assets gives wisdom on how to dissuade Iran best. Sanctions are not the best option for dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Instead, the U.S. should hold at risk those three assets in order to change Tehran's cost-benefit analysis regarding the amount of risk it is willing to endure. Finally, while Iran's operational code suggests some benefit to Iran having a virtual nuclear capability, having an operational, nuclear weapon capability appears to hold more benefit to Tehran than a mere virtual capability.","abstract_html":"It is imperative U.S. policy-makers and their international partners dissuade Tehran from producing a nuclear weapon, and in the event policy-makers cannot, to deter Tehran from ever launching a nuclear weapon. Operational code analysis seeks to understand how a government makes decisions; greater understanding leads to a more effective deterrent strategy. Alexander George, a follower of Nathan Leites, further defined the operational code framework by asking ten questions, the answers to which define a government's operational code. This thesis asks and answers George's ten questions in relation to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tehran's operational code is then applied to the issue of dissuading and deterring Iran in keeping with the tenets of tailored deterrence theory. Iran's operational code reveals strategic uses for nuclear weapons, as well as three targets of value the U.S. can hold at risk in order to deter Iran: disintegration of the "Axis of Resistance;” isolation from China and/or Russia; and the stimulation of internal public opposition. Realizing the extent to with Tehran values those assets gives wisdom on how to dissuade Iran best. Sanctions are not the best option for dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Instead, the U.S. should hold at risk those three assets in order to change Tehran's cost-benefit analysis regarding the amount of risk it is willing to endure. Finally, while Iran's operational code suggests some benefit to Iran having a virtual nuclear capability, having an operational, nuclear weapon capability appears to hold more benefit to Tehran than a mere virtual capability.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Backus, Austin Alexander"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Master of Science in Defense and Strategic Studies","degree_level":"Masters","degree_discipline":"Defense and Strategic Studies","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Andrei Shoumikhin"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013-12-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2013-12-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:16:37Z","subjects":["operational code","the Islamic Republic of Iran","tailored deterrence","dissuasion","proliferation","nuclear weapons","Verbs in Context (VICS)","Defense and Security Studies"],"languages":[],"rights":["© Austin Alexander Backus"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/1484","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Andrei Shoumikhin"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Backus, Austin Alexander"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Defense and Strategic Studies"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Science in Defense and Strategic Studies"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["operational code","the Islamic Republic of Iran","tailored deterrence","dissuasion","proliferation","nuclear weapons","Verbs in Context (VICS)","Defense and Security Studies"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["© Austin Alexander Backus"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/1484"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["It is imperative U.S. policy-makers and their international partners dissuade Tehran from producing a nuclear weapon, and in the event policy-makers cannot, to deter Tehran from ever launching a nuclear weapon. Operational code analysis seeks to understand how a government makes decisions; greater understanding leads to a more effective deterrent strategy. Alexander George, a follower of Nathan Leites, further defined the operational code framework by asking ten questions, the answers to which define a government's operational code. This thesis asks and answers George's ten questions in relation to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tehran's operational code is then applied to the issue of dissuading and deterring Iran in keeping with the tenets of tailored deterrence theory. Iran's operational code reveals strategic uses for nuclear weapons, as well as three targets of value the U.S. can hold at risk in order to deter Iran: disintegration of the \"Axis of Resistance;” isolation from China and/or Russia; and the stimulation of internal public opposition. Realizing the extent to with Tehran values those assets gives wisdom on how to dissuade Iran best. Sanctions are not the best option for dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Instead, the U.S. should hold at risk those three assets in order to change Tehran's cost-benefit analysis regarding the amount of risk it is willing to endure. Finally, while Iran's operational code suggests some benefit to Iran having a virtual nuclear capability, having an operational, nuclear weapon capability appears to hold more benefit to Tehran than a mere virtual capability."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Operational Code of the Islamic Repulic of Iran and a Tailored Approach"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Andrei Shoumikhin"],"dc:creator":["Backus, Austin Alexander"],"dc:description.abstract":["It is imperative U.S. policy-makers and their international partners dissuade Tehran from producing a nuclear weapon, and in the event policy-makers cannot, to deter Tehran from ever launching a nuclear weapon. Operational code analysis seeks to understand how a government makes decisions; greater understanding leads to a more effective deterrent strategy. Alexander George, a follower of Nathan Leites, further defined the operational code framework by asking ten questions, the answers to which define a government's operational code. This thesis asks and answers George's ten questions in relation to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tehran's operational code is then applied to the issue of dissuading and deterring Iran in keeping with the tenets of tailored deterrence theory. Iran's operational code reveals strategic uses for nuclear weapons, as well as three targets of value the U.S. can hold at risk in order to deter Iran: disintegration of the \"Axis of Resistance;” isolation from China and/or Russia; and the stimulation of internal public opposition. Realizing the extent to with Tehran values those assets gives wisdom on how to dissuade Iran best. Sanctions are not the best option for dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Instead, the U.S. should hold at risk those three assets in order to change Tehran's cost-benefit analysis regarding the amount of risk it is willing to endure. Finally, while Iran's operational code suggests some benefit to Iran having a virtual nuclear capability, having an operational, nuclear weapon capability appears to hold more benefit to Tehran than a mere virtual capability."],"dc:identifier":["https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/1484"],"dc:rights":["© Austin Alexander Backus"],"dc:subject":["operational code","the Islamic Republic of Iran","tailored deterrence","dissuasion","proliferation","nuclear weapons","Verbs in Context (VICS)","Defense and Security Studies"],"dc:title":["The Operational Code of the Islamic Repulic of Iran and a Tailored Approach"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Defense and Strategic Studies"],"thesis:degree_level":["Masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Science in Defense and Strategic Studies"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:16:37Z"}