Since the beginning of strategic nuclear arms control negotiations in 1969, Moscow and Washington have entered discussions with priorities to be met, though these differed greatly from one another. There were many driving factors for both world powers in seeking limitations and restrictions of strategic nuclear arms: one of the more pivotal for Washington was ensuring a sense of predictability, whereas a driving force for Moscow was to ensure a form of flexibility; other pivotal aspects will be explained within the paper as well. This thesis seeks to highlight the differences in priorities throughout the past five decades, as well as showing what outcomes these priorities produced. The potential for any future negotiations on strategic nuclear forces will also be considered, noting issues that may hinder such discussions. Priorities for any future strategic nuclear arms control negations are likely to carry forward, highlighting the continued relevance of reductions and verifications.
","abstract_html":"<p>Since the beginning of strategic nuclear arms control negotiations in 1969, Moscow and Washington have entered discussions with priorities to be met, though these differed greatly from one another. There were many driving factors for both world powers in seeking limitations and restrictions of strategic nuclear arms: one of the more pivotal for Washington was ensuring a sense of predictability, whereas a driving force for Moscow was to ensure a form of flexibility; other pivotal aspects will be explained within the paper as well. This thesis seeks to highlight the differences in priorities throughout the past five decades, as well as showing what outcomes these priorities produced. The potential for any future negotiations on strategic nuclear forces will also be considered, noting issues that may hinder such discussions. Priorities for any future strategic nuclear arms control negations are likely to carry forward, highlighting the continued relevance of reductions and verifications.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Archambault, Christopher Marc"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Master of Science in Defense and Strategic Studies","degree_level":"Masters","degree_discipline":"Defense and Strategic Studies","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["John Rose"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2012-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:16:23Z","subjects":["arms control","ballistic missile defense","nuclear weapons","Russia","strategic stability","U.S.-Russia relations","Defense and Security Studies"],"languages":[],"rights":["© Christopher Marc Archambault"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/1367","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["John Rose"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Archambault, Christopher Marc"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Defense and Strategic Studies"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Science in Defense and Strategic Studies"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["arms control","ballistic missile defense","nuclear weapons","Russia","strategic stability","U.S.-Russia relations","Defense and Security Studies"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["© Christopher Marc Archambault"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/1367"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Since the beginning of strategic nuclear arms control negotiations in 1969, Moscow and Washington have entered discussions with priorities to be met, though these differed greatly from one another. There were many driving factors for both world powers in seeking limitations and restrictions of strategic nuclear arms: one of the more pivotal for Washington was ensuring a sense of predictability, whereas a driving force for Moscow was to ensure a form of flexibility; other pivotal aspects will be explained within the paper as well. This thesis seeks to highlight the differences in priorities throughout the past five decades, as well as showing what outcomes these priorities produced. The potential for any future negotiations on strategic nuclear forces will also be considered, noting issues that may hinder such discussions. Priorities for any future strategic nuclear arms control negations are likely to carry forward, highlighting the continued relevance of reductions and verifications.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Varying Priorities in Strategic Nuclear Arms Control"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["John Rose"],"dc:creator":["Archambault, Christopher Marc"],"dc:description.abstract":["Since the beginning of strategic nuclear arms control negotiations in 1969, Moscow and Washington have entered discussions with priorities to be met, though these differed greatly from one another. There were many driving factors for both world powers in seeking limitations and restrictions of strategic nuclear arms: one of the more pivotal for Washington was ensuring a sense of predictability, whereas a driving force for Moscow was to ensure a form of flexibility; other pivotal aspects will be explained within the paper as well. This thesis seeks to highlight the differences in priorities throughout the past five decades, as well as showing what outcomes these priorities produced. The potential for any future negotiations on strategic nuclear forces will also be considered, noting issues that may hinder such discussions. Priorities for any future strategic nuclear arms control negations are likely to carry forward, highlighting the continued relevance of reductions and verifications.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/1367"],"dc:rights":["© Christopher Marc Archambault"],"dc:subject":["arms control","ballistic missile defense","nuclear weapons","Russia","strategic stability","U.S.-Russia relations","Defense and Security Studies"],"dc:title":["Varying Priorities in Strategic Nuclear Arms Control"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Defense and Strategic Studies"],"thesis:degree_level":["Masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Science in Defense and Strategic Studies"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:16:23Z"}