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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Bilateral exchanges in social networks and the design of public institutions

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In this thesis, I study bilateral exchanges in social networks. I integrate the market based approach in economics and network based approach in sociology. I also give a joint model of externalities and peer pressure in networks and propose mechanisms to control externalities in networked societies. The study of exchanges in networks is big and growing. In this thesis, I focus on exclusive exchanges or matching in bipartite networks where the matched couples perform an economic exchange with each other. This thesis makes three contributions to matching theory. First, I relax the standard assumptions of costless transfers between matched couples and introduce a new algorithm to compute stable matchings or core with proofs of correctness and convergence. Second, I introduce a new distributed dynamics and show that it converges to stable matching. Third, I give an axiomatic characterization of fair outcomes in bipartite matching based upon a collective bargaining argument and give a fast algorithm to compute it. I also introduce a joint model of externalities and peer pressure in networks and propose new design of public institutions that are more efficient in the control of externalities in networked societies. The design principles I propose are well suited for environmental policies, and health policies. The same design principles can also be used for marketing and revenue management for products and services with network externalities. I demonstrate the efficiency of my policies in two experiments. The first experiment showed that my proposed policies give better outcome in promoting higher physical activity among people than traditional policies such as Pigouvian subsidies. The second experiment showed that my proposed policy can help promote energy conservation and I report much higher conservation than any achieved through price shocks or any other energy conservation experiment in my knowledge.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Program in Media Arts and Sciences (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2014

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Mani, Ankur
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Alex (Sandy) Pentland.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
Language dc:language.iso
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/91435
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/91435

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
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citation

Mani, Ankur. Bilateral exchanges in social networks and the design of public institutions. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/91435