{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/8194"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/8194","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Mathematics, time, and confirmation","abstract":"This dissertation discusses two issues about abstract objects: their role in scientific theories, and their relation to time. Chapter 1, \"Why Apply Mathematics?\" argues that scientific theories are not about the mathematics that is applied in them, and defends this thesis against the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument. Chapter 2, \"Scientific Ontology,\" is a critical study of W. V. Quine's claim that metaphysics and mathematics are epistemologically on a par with natural science. It is argued that Quine's view relies on a unacceptable account of empirical confirmation. Chapter 3, \"Prior and the Platonist,\" demonstrates the incompatibility of two popular views about time: the \"Platonist\" thesis that some objects exist \"outside\" time, and A. N. Prior's proposal for treating tense on the model of modality. Chapter 4, \"What has Eternity Ever Done for You?\" argues against the widely held view that abstract objects exist eternally (\"outside\" time), and presents a defense of the rival view that they exist sempiternally (at all times)","abstract_html":"This dissertation discusses two issues about abstract objects: their role in scientific theories, and their relation to time. Chapter 1, "Why Apply Mathematics?" argues that scientific theories are not about the mathematics that is applied in them, and defends this thesis against the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument. Chapter 2, "Scientific Ontology," is a critical study of W. V. Quine's claim that metaphysics and mathematics are epistemologically on a par with natural science. It is argued that Quine's view relies on a unacceptable account of empirical confirmation. Chapter 3, "Prior and the Platonist," demonstrates the incompatibility of two popular views about time: the "Platonist" thesis that some objects exist "outside" time, and A. N. Prior's proposal for treating tense on the model of modality. Chapter 4, "What has Eternity Ever Done for You?" argues against the widely held view that abstract objects exist eternally ("outside" time), and presents a defense of the rival view that they exist sempiternally (at all times)","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Meyer, Ulrich, 1968-"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Robert C. Stalnaker."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2001,"date_issued":"2001","date_published":"2001","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:10Z","subjects":["Linguistics and Philosophy."],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission."],"rights_urls":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/8194","http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/8194"],"render_values":[{"text":"http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/8194","href":"http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/8194","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8194","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Robert C. Stalnaker."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.other","label":"Dc Contributor Other","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 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Chapter 1, \"Why Apply Mathematics?\" argues that scientific theories are not about the mathematics that is applied in them, and defends this thesis against the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument. Chapter 2, \"Scientific Ontology,\" is a critical study of W. V. Quine's claim that metaphysics and mathematics are epistemologically on a par with natural science. It is argued that Quine's view relies on a unacceptable account of empirical confirmation. Chapter 3, \"Prior and the Platonist,\" demonstrates the incompatibility of two popular views about time: the \"Platonist\" thesis that some objects exist \"outside\" time, and A. N. Prior's proposal for treating tense on the model of modality. Chapter 4, \"What has Eternity Ever Done for You?\" argues against the widely held view that abstract objects exist eternally (\"outside\" time), and presents a defense of the rival view that they exist sempiternally (at all times)"]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Mathematics, time, and confirmation"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Robert C. Stalnaker."],"dc:contributor.department":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy."],"dc:contributor.other":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy."],"dc:creator":["Meyer, Ulrich, 1968-"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2009-01-30T18:37:13Z"],"dc:date.available":["2009-01-30T18:37:13Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2001"],"dc:description":["Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2001.","Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-128)."],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation discusses two issues about abstract objects: their role in scientific theories, and their relation to time. Chapter 1, \"Why Apply Mathematics?\" argues that scientific theories are not about the mathematics that is applied in them, and defends this thesis against the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument. Chapter 2, \"Scientific Ontology,\" is a critical study of W. V. Quine's claim that metaphysics and mathematics are epistemologically on a par with natural science. It is argued that Quine's view relies on a unacceptable account of empirical confirmation. Chapter 3, \"Prior and the Platonist,\" demonstrates the incompatibility of two popular views about time: the \"Platonist\" thesis that some objects exist \"outside\" time, and A. N. Prior's proposal for treating tense on the model of modality. Chapter 4, \"What has Eternity Ever Done for You?\" argues against the widely held view that abstract objects exist eternally (\"outside\" time), and presents a defense of the rival view that they exist sempiternally (at all times)"],"dc:description.degree":["Ph.D."],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/8194","http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8194"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission."],"dc:rights.uri":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/8194","http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"dc:subject":["Linguistics and Philosophy."],"dc:title":["Mathematics, time, and confirmation"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:10Z"}