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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Diversionary temptations : presidential incentives and the political use of force

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This dissertation assesses U.S. presidents' incentives for diversionary war. The political benefits of the use of force were measured and compared to the benefits of other dramatic foreign policy activities. Gains from force were modest, not unique, and discounted in many circumstances of political need. Statistical tests measured the changes in presidential approval ratings following uses of force, major diplomatic events, presidential speeches, and foreign travel by presidents, in the period 1953-2000. Historical sources and newspaper archives were used to identify and characterize uses of force and diplomatic events. Uses of force provide only modest and short-lived approval gains (average 6% increase with 3 month half life for major uses). Approval changes were greater with more media coverage, Congressional support, or popular goals (e.g., protecting American lives, not humanitarian intervention). Approval gains were higher during recessions, but losses occurred when prior approval was low for non-economic reasons (e.g., scandals). Diplomatic events produced slightly smaller benefits, conditioned by similar variables except for retaining their popularity during scandals. Foreign travel and speeches had little impact. The frequency of presidential activities changes in response to political variables, in ways that are consistent with maximization of political benefits. Uses of force became slightly more common during recessions, less common when approval was low for non-economic reasons.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2003

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Burbach, David T
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Harvey M. Sapolsky.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
Language dc:language.iso
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7970
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/7970

Chain of custody

source
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MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
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citation

Burbach, David T. Diversionary temptations : presidential incentives and the political use of force. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7970