{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/78444"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/78444","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs","abstract":"In settings of incomplete information, we put forward: (1) a very conservative - indeed, purely set-theoretic- model of the beliefs (including totally wrong ones) that each player may have about the payoff types of his opponents, and (2) a new and robust solution concept, based on mutual belief of rationality, capable of leveraging such conservative beliefs. We exemplify the applicability of our new approach for single-good auctions. In particular we show that, under our solution concept, there exists a simple normal-form mechanism, which always sells the good, always has non-negative revenue, and guarantees (up to an arbitrarily small, additive constant) a revenue benchmark that is always greater than or equal to the second-highest valuation, and sometimes much greater. By contrast, we also prove that the same benchmark cannot even be approximated within any positive factor, under classical solution concepts.","abstract_html":"In settings of incomplete information, we put forward: (1) a very conservative - indeed, purely set-theoretic- model of the beliefs (including totally wrong ones) that each player may have about the payoff types of his opponents, and (2) a new and robust solution concept, based on mutual belief of rationality, capable of leveraging such conservative beliefs. We exemplify the applicability of our new approach for single-good auctions. In particular we show that, under our solution concept, there exists a simple normal-form mechanism, which always sells the good, always has non-negative revenue, and guarantees (up to an arbitrarily small, additive constant) a revenue benchmark that is always greater than or equal to the second-highest valuation, and sometimes much greater. By contrast, we also prove that the same benchmark cannot even be approximated within any positive factor, under classical solution concepts.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Chen, Jing, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Silvio Micali."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012","date_published":"2012","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:36Z","subjects":["Electrical Engineering and Computer Science."],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission."],"rights_urls":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/78444","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Silvio Micali."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.other","label":"Dc Contributor Other","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Chen, Jing, Ph. D. 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They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission."]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/78444"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2012.","Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.","Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-66)."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In settings of incomplete information, we put forward: (1) a very conservative - indeed, purely set-theoretic- model of the beliefs (including totally wrong ones) that each player may have about the payoff types of his opponents, and (2) a new and robust solution concept, based on mutual belief of rationality, capable of leveraging such conservative beliefs. We exemplify the applicability of our new approach for single-good auctions. In particular we show that, under our solution concept, there exists a simple normal-form mechanism, which always sells the good, always has non-negative revenue, and guarantees (up to an arbitrarily small, additive constant) a revenue benchmark that is always greater than or equal to the second-highest valuation, and sometimes much greater. By contrast, we also prove that the same benchmark cannot even be approximated within any positive factor, under classical solution concepts."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Silvio Micali."],"dc:contributor.department":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science."],"dc:contributor.other":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science."],"dc:creator":["Chen, Jing, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2013-04-12T19:24:29Z"],"dc:date.available":["2013-04-12T19:24:29Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2012"],"dc:description":["Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2012.","Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.","Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-66)."],"dc:description.abstract":["In settings of incomplete information, we put forward: (1) a very conservative - indeed, purely set-theoretic- model of the beliefs (including totally wrong ones) that each player may have about the payoff types of his opponents, and (2) a new and robust solution concept, based on mutual belief of rationality, capable of leveraging such conservative beliefs. We exemplify the applicability of our new approach for single-good auctions. In particular we show that, under our solution concept, there exists a simple normal-form mechanism, which always sells the good, always has non-negative revenue, and guarantees (up to an arbitrarily small, additive constant) a revenue benchmark that is always greater than or equal to the second-highest valuation, and sometimes much greater. By contrast, we also prove that the same benchmark cannot even be approximated within any positive factor, under classical solution concepts."],"dc:description.degree":["Ph.D."],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/78444"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission."],"dc:rights.uri":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"dc:subject":["Electrical Engineering and Computer Science."],"dc:title":["Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:36Z"}