Diplomacy derailed : the consequences of U.S. diplomatic disengagement

Advocates of diplomatic engagement with states of concern argue that talking to both allies and adversaries is essential for advancing U.S. foreign policy interests. Critics of this approach argue that engagement with these regimes is tantamount to appeasement and signals acceptance of behavior that ought to be condemned. In their view, little can be gained by talking to these states. Thus, diplomatic sanctions are seen as a low-cost means of isolating and delegitimizing regimes. This perspective, however, fails to recognize that maintaining diplomatic sanctions may actually entail a number of substantial costs to the United States and may even undermine economic sanctions' effectiveness. Although the U.S. has employed policies of diplomatic disengagement in approximately 30% of its economic sanctions episodes, studies have focused solely on economic sanctions. Seeking to weigh in on this debate, my doctoral dissertation focuses on two central questions: (1) What are the effects of diplomatic sanctions as a foreign policy tool? and (2) Do diplomatic sanctions increase or decrease the likelihood of target state compliance with U.S. demands? I develop and test a new theory of sanctions effectiveness focusing on the role of information, communication, and diplomatic ties. I argue that diplomatic sanctions and disengagement result in unintended consequences, including a loss of valuable intelligence, increased difficulty of communication, and reduced capabilities for public diplomacy in the target state. I also argue that when United States is more diplomatically engaged with the target state, economic sanctions are more likely to be effective in getting the target state to comply with U.S. demands. To reach these conclusions, I use both quantitative and qualitative analysis. I use economic sanctions data from 1945-2000 from the Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott database, along with original data on diplomatic sanctions. I conduct ordered logit multivariate regressions to test the diplomatic sanctions hypotheses and assess whether or not diplomatic sanctions impact the effectiveness of economic sanctions. I also conduct comprehensive longitudinal case studies of Sudan and Libya, along with a series of shorter mini-case studies focusing on Afghanistan, South Africa and Burma.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2011

Author dc:creator

• Maller, Tara (Tara Jennifer)

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Kenneth Oye.

• Political Science.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/68931

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/68931