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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Framework theories in science

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis consists of three papers on the nature of scientific theories and inference. In many cases, scientific theories can be regarded as organized into hierarchies, with higher levels sometimes called 'paradigms', and lower levels encoding more specific or concrete hypotheses. The first chapter uses hierarchical Bayesian models to show that the assessment of higher level theories may proceed by the same Bayesian principles as the assessment of more specific hypotheses. It thus shows how the evaluation of higher level theories can be evidence-driven, despite claims to the contrary by authors such as Kuhn. The chapter also discusses how hierarchical Bayesian models may help to resolve certain issues for Bayesian philosophy of science, particularly how to model the introduction of new theories. The second chapter discusses the relationship between Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and Bayesianism. Van Fraassen has raised the concern that the explanatory considerations in IBE go beyond the Bayesian formalism, making IBE incompatible with Bayesianism. The response so far has been that the explanatory considerations can be accommodated within the Bayesian formalism by stipulating that they should constrain the assignment of the probabilities. I suggest a third alternative, which is that the extra explanatory considerations have their origins in the relationship between higher and lower level theories and can be modeled in Bayesian terms without directly constraining the probabilities. The third chapter discusses an aspect of the debate over scientific realism. The No Miracles argument and the Pessimistic Induction are often seen as the primary arguments for and against scientific realism. Yet recently it has been alleged that both of these arguments commit the base-rate fallacy. I argue that both arguments can be formulated in a non-fallacious manner, so neither should be dismissed on the grounds of faulty form alone.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2010

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Henderson, Leah
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Robert Stalnaker.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
Language dc:language.iso
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62410
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/62410

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Henderson, Leah. Framework theories in science. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62410