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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

A decentralized incentive mechanism for company-wide energy consumption reduction

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis proposes a decentralized reward-based incentive mechanism to address the problem of noncomplying subsidiaries when the parent company wish to meet its targeted energy consumption level. Besides its effectiveness in ensuring compliance, the proposed mechanism is advantageous as it is able to induce the optimal subsidiary behavior that maximizes the company profit given a carefully chosen reward allocation scheme. In addition, when the company is willing to trade part of its profit for an operationally simple mechanism, simple uniform allocation scheme is highly effective when the subsidiaries exhibit certain degree of symmetry. The results above are drawn from our investigation on a more general model: Cournot competition under a joint constraint. For this model, we study the equilibrium behavior under free competition and compare the profit and total surplus achieved with the corresponding values when different levels of coordination are introduced in the market (i.e., the Monopoly market and the society-wide coordinated market). We establish tight upper bounds for the profit and total surplus loss due to lack of coordination as functions of various market characteristics (i.e., number of firms, intensity of competition and asymmetry between firms).

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computation for Design and Optimization Program.
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2010

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Wang, Jingxi, S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Georgia Perakis.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
Language dc:language.iso
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61897
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/61897

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Wang, Jingxi, S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A decentralized incentive mechanism for company-wide energy consumption reduction. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61897