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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Defeat in victory : organizational learning dysfunction in counterinsurgency

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Two puzzles dominate the study of organizational learning and counterinsurgency. First, militaries often struggle to develop effective strategies to address the problem of counterinsurgency. Second, their strategic performance seldom improves over successive counterinsurgency campaigns. This study offers a theoretical explanation for these dominant patterns of learning dysfunction. It argues that a set of closely held, professional beliefs - the military operational code - and bureaucratic preferences distort the organizations' initial response, subsequent adaptation and interwar retention. The military operational code leads militaries to misunderstand counterinsurgency in a systematic and debilitating fashion; bureaucratic interests lead them to reject the most effective strategies once they have been uncovered. When militaries manage to break with this dysfunctional pattern, it because their professional judgment is constrained; high civilian participation and/or resource scarcity force often force militaries to adopt political strategies that are less congenial but more effective in restoring state authority. This study tests the theory against six empirical cases: Indochina, the Indochina-Algeria interlude, Algeria, British Palestine, Malaya, and Thailand. These cases strongly suggest that the dysfunctional learning patterns are the product of broadly shared, professional beliefs and bureaucratic interests rather than the common, alternative explanations based on experience, culture or normative and material constraints.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2008

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Jackson, Colin F. (Colin Francis)
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Roger D. Peterson.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
Language dc:language.iso
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/53077
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/53077

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
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citation

Jackson, Colin F. (Colin Francis). Defeat in victory : organizational learning dysfunction in counterinsurgency. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/53077