Modality and inquiry

The possibilities we consider or eliminate in inquiry are epistemic possibilities. This dissertation is mainly about what it is to say or believe that something is possible in this sense. Chapter 1 ('Epistemic Contradictions') describes a new puzzle about epistemic modals and uses it to explore their logic and semantics. Chapter 2 ('Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality') situates the work of chapter 1 into a larger picture of content and communication, developing a broadly expressivist account of the language of epistemic modality. Chapter 3 ('Content and Modal Resolution') argues that states of belief should be understood as relativized to an inquiry, understood formally as a certain way of dividing up logical space.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2008

Author dc:creator

• Yalcin, Seth

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Robert Stalnaker and Stephen Yablo.

• Linguistics and Philosophy.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45893

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/45893